State v. Shannon Rajda / State v. Albert Lee Lape, Jr.
196 A.3d 1108
Vt.2018Background
- Two consolidated Vermont DUI cases where defendants refused warrantless blood tests after arrest; State dismissed separate criminal-refusal charges post-Birchfield and sought to introduce refusal evidence at trial.
- Trial court granted defendants’ motions in limine, ruling Birchfield established a Fourth Amendment bar to admitting evidence of refusal to submit to warrantless blood tests.
- State appealed interlocutory orders; defendants contended appeals were moot because 2017 amendments to Vermont’s implied consent statute narrowed admissibility for blood-test refusals.
- Legislature amended 23 V.S.A. § 1202 after Birchfield to require warrants for blood tests and changed § 1202(b) to explicitly allow only breath-test refusals to be admitted as evidence.
- Vermont Supreme Court concluded the statutory amendment did not render the constitutional question moot and reversed the trial court, holding the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit admitting evidence of refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test in a DUI prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Birchfield bars admission at criminal DUI trial of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test | Birchfield only forbids criminal prosecution for refusal and warrantless blood draws; it does not preclude admitting refusal evidence at trial | Birchfield created a Fourth Amendment right to refuse warrantless blood tests that forbids using the refusal as evidence | Reversed trial court: Fourth Amendment does not bar admission of refusal evidence in DUI prosecutions under implied-consent framework |
| Whether 2017 amendment to Vermont’s implied-consent statute moots constitutional question | Amendment did not clearly and completely foreclose admission of blood-refusal evidence; legislative intent was only to comply with Birchfield’s constitutional limits | Amendment demonstrates Legislature intended to prohibit admission of blood-refusal evidence, so appeals are moot | Amendment did not render constitutional issue moot; court resolved constitutional question on merits |
| Whether admitting refusal evidence impermissibly coerces consent or otherwise burdens constitutional rights | Admitting refusal evidence is not the functional equivalent of criminalizing refusal and does not unduly burden Fourth Amendment interests | Admission penalizes exercise of Fourth Amendment right and is thus barred | Admission is permissible; evidentiary consequence is different and less coercive than criminal punishment |
| Whether evidentiary refusal-rule conflicts with remaining statutory provisions (e.g., warnings, warrant rules) | Statute’s other provisions still permit informing suspects refusal may be used and allow admission when warrant later obtained; thus no clear bar exists | Statute’s amendment to §1202(b) plus legislative history show intent to eliminate blood-refusal admissibility | Court treats statutory language as ambiguous and resolves the constitutional question without deeming statute dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (U.S. 1957) (upheld routine blood testing in accident context; minimal intrusion justified by public safety)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (warrantless blood draw incident to arrest upheld where exigent circumstances existed; blood extraction not testimonial)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1983) (admission of refusal to take BAC test does not violate Fifth Amendment)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (U.S. 2013) (exigency for warrantless blood draw assessed case-by-case; metabolization alone not per se exigency)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (held warrantless breath tests permissible incident to arrest but warrantless blood tests unconstitutional absent exigency; criminalizing refusal of blood test invalid)
- Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (U.S. 1980) (constitutional rights may be indirectly burdened by the criminal process; not every government-imposed choice is forbidden)
- McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (U.S. 1971) (criminal process often requires difficult choices; requiring a choice does not necessarily impair constitutional rights)