STATE v. SHADE
407 P.3d 790
| Okla. Civ. App. | 2017Background
- Daniel L. Shade, Jr. had felony convictions in two cases (Cleveland County and Logan County) and received a full pardon in 2012.
- In June 2016 Shade filed to expunge records for the Cleveland County case, asserting he had a pardon and ten years had passed since completion of sentence; he did not mention the Logan County conviction in his petition.
- At the August 2016 hearing OSBI objected, relying on 22 O.S. Supp. 2015 § 18(A)(11), which required that a petitioner "has not been convicted of any other felony" and ten years since conviction to qualify to file for expungement.
- The trial court granted expungement, reasoning Shade’s circumstances and pardon put him within the statute’s intent; OSBI appealed.
- During the appeal the statute was amended (2016) to allow petitioners convicted of not more than two nonviolent felonies who received pardons, but require twenty years since the last misdemeanor or felony conviction (22 O.S. Supp. 2016 § 18(A)(13)).
- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the expungement order and remanded for further proceedings, holding the 2016 amendment applies retroactively (procedural/remedial) and the trial court must apply the amended criteria and make first-instance findings (e.g., whether Shade was convicted of not more than two nonviolent felonies and whether twenty years have passed since his last conviction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2016 amendment to § 18 applies to a pending expungement petition | The State argued the amended statute (22 O.S. Supp. 2016 § 18(A)(13)) should apply and Shade failed to meet its 20-year requirement | Shade relied on pre-amendment § 18(A)(11) and the trial court applied that standard to grant expungement | The court held the 2016 amendment is remedial/procedural and applies to pending proceedings, so the amended statute governs |
| Whether Shade qualified to file under § 18 as amended | OSBI argued Shade failed to prove the 20-year lapse since last conviction and thus did not meet burden | Shade argued he had a pardon and that concurrent sentences and circumstances placed him within the statute’s intent (trial court relied on this) | The court found no first-instance factual findings under the amended law and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Shade meets the amended criteria (number/type of felonies and 20-year requirement) |
| Whether the amendment impairs vested rights or violates ex post facto principles | OSBI suggested applicability is proper; no ex post facto issue asserted by Shade | Shade did not claim vested-rights or ex post facto protection from the amendment | The court held the amendment does not affect vested rights or increase punishment; no ex post facto violation and retroactive application is permissible for remedial/procedural statutes |
| Sufficiency of record to support expungement under amended law | OSBI asserted the record lacks proof of the 20-year requirement | Shade’s petition and trial court order did not address the amended statutory elements (e.g., 20 years, status of convictions) | Held: record insufficient—trial court must make determinations under the amended statute; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Forest Oil Corp. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 807 P.2d 774 (1990 OK 58) (remedial/procedural statutes may apply retrospectively if they do not affect vested rights)
- Hammons v. Muskogee Med. Ctr. Auth., 697 P.2d 539 (1985 OK 22) (statutes or amendments are prospective unless clearly otherwise; remedial statutes may operate retrospectively)
- Thomas v. Cumberland Operating Co., 569 P.2d 974 (1977 OK 164) (procedural statutes presumed applicable to pending actions absent effect on substantive rights)
- Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 78 P.3d 542 (2003 OK 81) (legislation affecting only procedure generally applies to pending proceedings)
- Am. Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 221 P.3d 1289 (2009 OK 68) (amendments that intrude on substantive rights cannot be applied retroactively)
- Heaton v. State, 669 N.E.2d 885 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (expungement is a privilege, not a vested right)
- In re Dyer, 163 S.W.3d 915 (Mo. 2005) (expungement statutes are remedial; no vested right in expungement)
- Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004 (2013 OK 43) (ex post facto analysis: law is prohibited if it inflicts greater punishment than at time of offense)