493 P.3d 335
Mont.2021Background
- On February 17, 2018, Trooper Burton stopped Secrease for traffic violations and detected signs of intoxication and marijuana use.
- Secrease performed poorly on field sobriety tests, refused a preliminary breath test and later refused a requested blood test.
- Trooper Burton obtained a telephonic search warrant for Secrease’s blood; Secrease still refused at the hospital and no blood draw occurred.
- Secrease was charged with felony DUI and misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer; a jury convicted him of both.
- At trial the defense did not propose or object to jury instructions; the court instructed the jury that “knowingly” means being aware of one’s conduct (a conduct-based definition) rather than the results-based definition pertinent to obstruction.
- The Supreme Court held defense counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the correct results-based “knowingly” instruction, found prejudice, reversed the obstruction conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an incorrect jury instruction on the mental state for obstructing a peace officer | State: No reversible error; prosecutor’s closing supplied the correct standard; defendant cannot meet prejudice burden | Secrease: Counsel’s failure to seek the results-based “knowingly” instruction reduced the State’s burden and prejudiced the verdict | Counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial; obstruction conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial |
| Whether the ineffective-assistance claim is reviewable on direct appeal (vs. PCR) | State: Heavy burden to show ineffective assistance on direct appeal | Secrease: No plausible justification existed for counsel’s omission; direct review appropriate | Direct appeal appropriate because no plausible justification for omission |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
- State v. Kougl, 97 P.3d 1095 (Mont. 2004) (court must instruct jury; closing argument cannot substitute for instruction)
- State v. Johnston, 237 P.3d 70 (Mont. 2010) (results-based definition of "knowingly" applies to obstruction charge)
- City of Kalispell v. Cameron, 46 P.3d 46 (Mont. 2002) (awareness that conduct would hinder officers is required for obstruction)