State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 432 P.3d 154

Matthew Hearn, an honorably discharged veteran with PTSD, pleaded guilty to felony battery by a prisoner; a specialty courts officer deemed him eligible for Nevada’s veterans court program.
NRS 176A.290(2) provided that if the charged offense or a prior felony involved use or threatened use of force or violence, the court "may not assign the defendant to the program unless the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the assignment."
At sentencing the State refused to stipulate to Hearn’s assignment; Hearn challenged subsection (2) as violating Nevada’s separation of powers doctrine.
The district court held the prosecutorial-stipulation language unconstitutional as an executive veto over judicial sentencing discretion and severed that clause.
The State sought a writ of mandamus; the Nevada Supreme Court accepted the writ to resolve the important, inconsistently decided question.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NRS 176A.290(2)’s requirement that the prosecutor stipulate before a defendant charged with or having a prior violent felony may be assigned to veterans court violates separation of powers	Hearn: prosecutorial stipulation creates an executive veto over a judicial sentencing decision, infringing the judiciary	State: statute lawfully structures eligibility; requiring prosecutorial agreement is a permissible legislative condition on court discretion	The statute’s prosecutorial-stipulation clause is unconstitutional under Nevada’s separation of powers because it vests an executive veto over a judicial sentencing function
Whether the unconstitutional clause is severable from NRS 176A.290(2)	Hearn: severance leaves a workable statute aligned with legislative intent to aid nonviolent veterans	State: (implicitly) severance is not appropriate or would frustrate legislative design	The clause "unless the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the assignment" is severable; remaining statute stands and, after severance, violent offenders are categorically ineligible for the program unless legislature acts

Stromberg v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 1, 200 P.3d 509 (Nev. 2009) (distinguishes charging discretion from sentencing discretion; sentencing choices are judicial)
People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248, 497 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1972) (statute conditioning court’s placement in treatment program on prosecutor’s approval impermissibly vests executive control over judicial function)
State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982) (once legislature grants sentencing discretion, it cannot make that discretion contingent on prosecutor approval)
State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 267 P.3d 777 (Nev. 2011) (writ of mandamus proper to control manifest abuse or arbitrary exercise of discretion)