State v. Seamon, 165 A.3d 342

Detective Tracy, in plain clothes and driving an unmarked car with a concealed recorder, interviewed Andrew Seamon at a friend’s house about allegations of sexual abuse of a child; Tracy did not give Miranda warnings or disclose the recording.
The one-hour interview occurred in a location Seamon chose; Tracy told Seamon she would not arrest him that day and encouraged him to tell the truth; Seamon described potentially inappropriate conduct but did not admit to sexual acts.
Seamon was later indicted on counts of gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact; at trial the child testified to multiple discrete instances of sexual contact; jury convicted Seamon of unlawful sexual contact and deadlocked or acquitted on other counts.
Seamon moved to suppress his statements as involuntary and Miranda violations, and appealed his sentence arguing the court considered acquitted/unreliable conduct in setting the basic sentence and misapplied sex-offender registration law.
The motion court denied suppression, finding the interview noncustodial and voluntary; the trial court sentenced Seamon to nine years with six years active and ordered sex-offender registration notification using SORNA 2013 forms.
On appeal the court affirmed the denial of suppression and the sentence, but corrected that Seamon will be subject to lifetime registration under SORNA 1999 upon release.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Seamon)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Voluntariness of statements / motion to suppress	Statements were involuntary due to friendly/coercive interview and Seamon’s mental health; Miranda required	Interview was noncustodial, noncoercive, no promises or threats, and Seamon voluntarily spoke	Denial affirmed: totality of circumstances shows statements voluntary and noncustodial
Use of acquitted/related conduct at sentencing (basic sentence)	Court improperly relied on multiple instances and conduct tied to gross sexual assault counts of which acquitted/mistrial occurred	Court may consider reliable, relevant information from trial testimony to determine basic sentence	Affirmed: court permissibly relied on child’s trial testimony as factually reliable when setting basic sentence
Consideration of Seamon’s history as mitigating	Court ignored Seamon’s history of being sexually abused as a child, which should mitigate	Victimization is not presumptively mitigating; court considered memoranda and individualized factors	No reversible error: court did not abuse discretion in weighing factors
Sex-offender registration form / law applied	Court erred by directing registration under SORNA 2013 (Tier III) rather than SORNA 1999 (lifetime)	Registration duty is statutory and triggered on release; court only notified defendant at sentencing	Affirmed conviction/sentence but corrected: defendant will be subject to SORNA 1999 lifetime registration upon release

State v. Wiley, 61 A.3d 750 (Me. 2013) (improper promises of leniency can render a confession involuntary)
State v. Hunt, 151 A.3d 911 (Me. 2016) (totality-of-circumstances voluntary-statement analysis; burden on State)
State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497 (Me. 1983) (confession voluntary if product of rational mind and not coerced)
State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1993) (framework for determining basic sentence separate from aggravating/mitigating factors)
State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164 (Me. 1986) (trial-derived testimony is factually reliable for sentencing)