State v. Scott Robertson(075326)
155 A.3d 571
| N.J. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 11, 2012, Scott Robertson was stopped after crossing the fog line repeatedly; officer smelled alcohol, administered field sobriety tests, arrested him, and an Alcotest showed a .13% BAC. He was charged with DWI and related offenses.
- Municipal court denied defendant’s discovery requests regarding Alcotest maintenance/data and, after a stipulated-facts trial, convicted him of DWI and imposed minimum penalties including a seven‑month license suspension.
- The municipal judge, without objection from the State, stayed the license suspension for 20 days to allow a Law Division appeal; at the Law Division de novo trial the court again convicted Robertson and reimposed the same sentence but conditionally extended a stay pending appeal to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and applied the Crowe stay standard, criticizing the lower courts for not stating reasons on the record when granting stays.
- The Supreme Court granted certification to decide the proper standards for stays of license suspensions in two contexts: (1) municipal court judgments pending a trial de novo in the Law Division, and (2) Law Division judgments pending appeal to the Appellate Division.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for stays of municipal-court DWI license suspensions pending a Law Division trial de novo | Crowe three‑part civil stay test should apply (as App. Div. held) | Crowe is ill‑fitting; defendants entitled to presumptive stay because guilt must be re-proven at de novo trial | Defendants seeking a trial de novo should be presumptively eligible for a stay; State must show the stay would pose a serious threat to public safety and that no conditions can mitigate the risk |
| Standard for stays of Law Division DWI convictions pending appeal to Appellate Division | Crowe (or similar) should govern | Rule 2:9-4 (criminal bail/stay standard) is controlling at this stage | Rule 2:9-4 applies; defendant bears burden to show (1) a substantial question on appeal, (2) no serious threat to safety if license remains, and (3) no significant flight risk |
| Role of Crowe v. De Gioia in DWI stay requests | Crowe’s three factors are a workable framework | Crowe is a civil test and misaligned with quasi‑criminal DWI proceedings | Crowe is not a good fit for DWI license‑suspension stays because its prongs misalign with de novo trials and the harms at issue |
| Use of conditional stays and record reasons | Courts may freely grant stays without special conditions or detailed on‑the‑record reasons | Lower courts should explain stay decisions and may impose restrictions to protect public safety | Courts may condition stays (restricted driving, ignition interlock, time limits); judges should state reasons on the record when ruling on stay motions |
Key Cases Cited
- Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (N.J. 1982) (articulated three‑part civil stay standard relied upon by Appellate Division)
- State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368 (N.J. 2015) (summarizes burdens at municipal and de novo trials for DWI)
- State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 2014) (Appellate Division opinion applying Crowe and critiquing lack of on‑the‑record reasons for stays)
- State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (N.J. 1999) (deference principles for concurrent factual/credibility findings on appeal)
- United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1985) (federal formulation of “substantial question” used to guide meaning under Rule 2:9-4)