State v. Scott, 2022 Ohio 4277

Background

Defendant Guy Billy Lee Scott was convicted in 1992 of assault, rape, and murder arising from Lesa Buckley’s July 1990 death; her body was recovered at a large lakeside party where many attendees were present.
No DNA testing was performed at trial; conviction rested primarily on eyewitness and circumstantial evidence (notably testimony by Tony Young) and some inculpatory statements/circumstantial conduct by Scott.
Scott petitioned in 2019 under Ohio’s postconviction DNA-testing statutes (R.C. 2953.71–.84); the trial court denied the petition as not meeting the statutory “outcome determinative” standard and the Twelfth District affirmed.
Scott argued the trial court should consider the possibility that postconviction test results could match a different person in the CODIS database when deciding whether to grant testing; the Supreme Court accepted that narrow question for review.
The Supreme Court held that the possibility of a CODIS match is not “available admissible evidence” at the pre-testing stage, but nevertheless concluded that, on the record before it, a presumed DNA exclusion of Scott—when analyzed with the available admissible evidence (including recantation evidence, lack of physical linkage, and alternative-suspect theory)—would be outcome determinative.
Judgment: Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded with instructions to accept Scott’s application for postconviction DNA testing.

Issues

Issue	Scott’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether a court deciding to grant postconviction DNA testing must treat the possibility of a CODIS match identifying someone other than the petitioner as “available admissible evidence.”	A trial court should consider the possibility that a postconviction DNA profile could match CODIS when assessing whether testing would be outcome determinative.	A CODIS match is speculative before testing; a CODIS search can be ordered only after testing, so the possibility of a match is not available admissible evidence at the pre-testing stage.	The Court: No. The mere possibility of a CODIS match is hypothetical and not “available admissible evidence” when deciding whether to accept an application for testing.
Whether a presumed DNA exclusion of Scott would be outcome determinative under R.C. 2953.74 (i.e., would create a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted).	An exclusion would undercut key eyewitness and circumstantial evidence, bolster alternative-suspect theories (the Johnson family), and thus would be outcome determinative.	The conviction rested on many corroborating eyewitness and circumstantial pieces of evidence; an exclusion would not necessarily eliminate the strong evidentiary margin supporting conviction.	The Court: The lower courts abused their discretion. Presumed exclusion, analyzed with the available admissible evidence (including recantation, lack of physical linkage, alternative suspects), would create a strong probability that no reasonable juror would have convicted; remand to approve testing.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Buehler, 113 Ohio St.3d 114 (2007) (abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denial of postconviction DNA testing)
State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12 (2008) (clarifying review and standards related to postconviction DNA claims)
State v. Ayers, 185 Ohio App.3d 168 (2009) (discussing evidentiary impact of DNA exclusions and role of CODIS searches after testing)
State v. Reynolds, 186 Ohio App.3d 1 (2009) (DNA implicating a third party can be outcome determinative when no physical evidence links applicant)
State v. Gavin, 195 N.E.3d 226 (4th Dist. 2022) (postconviction exclusion plus identification of alternative suspect can render testing outcome determinative)
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (Supreme Court recognition of DNA testing’s role in exoneration)
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (statement on criminal-law objective that guilty be convicted and innocent go free)