State v. Scott, 757 S.E.2d 533

Cynthia Nelson was found mortally wounded at defendant Antonio Scott's sister's apartment and died from a neck stab wound. Paramedics and a forensic pathologist treated the wound as an inflicted stab; Dr. Tormos initially said it was not self-inflicted but later conceded it "could have been an accident" after demonstration of a martial-arts maneuver.
The State's theory: Scott stabbed Nelson during an argument. Scott's statement to police: Nelson produced a "shiny and silver" object, advanced, and Scott used a martial-arts move (pushing her elbow up) causing her to stab herself.
Scott sought jury instructions on self-defense and involuntary manslaughter (the latter based on allegedly reckless conduct while lawfully defending himself). The trial court instructed on murder, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense but refused involuntary manslaughter; the jury convicted Scott of murder.
Trial court and State reasoned that a lawful act of self-defense cannot simultaneously be criminally negligent such that involuntary manslaughter would apply.
The court of appeals (lead opinion) affirmed, holding that under Scott's asserted facts the use of force was justified (and if justified, not reckless), so no basis existed to charge involuntary manslaughter. Judge Pieper dissented, arguing any evidence supporting involuntary manslaughter required the charge and would remand for new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to charge involuntary manslaughter	Scott: his martial-arts move was a lawful act of self-defense but performed recklessly, unintentionally causing Nelson's death, so jury should have been allowed to consider involuntary manslaughter	State/Trial court: if Scott's conduct was justified self-defense, it cannot simultaneously be criminally negligent; under Scott's version the threat (knife) justified as much or more force	Affirmed: no involuntary manslaughter charge required because evidence supporting justified self-defense negated a finding of reckless, criminally negligent conduct
Whether evidence created a factual dispute like in State v. Light that would permit both self-defense and involuntary manslaughter instructions	Scott: analogizes to Light where an unintentional act during a struggle supported involuntary manslaughter	State: Light turned on evidence the defendant acted unintentionally; here there is no evidence Scott acted unintentionally	Court: Light inapplicable—no evidence Scott acted unintentionally, so dual instruction not warranted

State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 706 S.E.2d 12 (involuntary manslaughter definitions)
State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 701 S.E.2d 766 (evidence at trial determines law to be charged)
State v. Brayboy, 387 S.C. 174, 691 S.E.2d 482 (definition of recklessness)
State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 716 S.E.2d 97 (use of reasonable force when defendant believed imminent danger)
Douglas v. State, 332 S.C. 67, 504 S.E.2d 307 (right to use force necessary for complete protection)
State v. Light, 378 S.C. 641, 664 S.E.2d 465 (where evidence shows unintentional act, both self-defense and involuntary manslaughter instructions may be warranted)
State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 466 S.E.2d 364 (distinguishing intentional self-defense shooting from unintentional conduct)
State v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 672 S.E.2d 786 (any evidence warranting involuntary manslaughter requires the charge)
State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 513 S.E.2d 104 (discussion distinguishing Pickens where defendant admitted intentional shooting)