State v. Scott, 397 P.3d 837

Tracy Scott shot and killed his wife Teresa; he admitted the killing but argued extreme emotional distress (EED) to reduce murder to manslaughter.
The marriage was volatile with prior domestic incidents; Scott had prior threats and a domestic-violence citation (later expunged) and Teresa had at times obtained a protective order.
The day before the shooting Teresa allegedly made a threat and Scott later noticed one of her guns missing from the safe; he testified he was frightened and believed the threat was serious.
At trial the prosecutor objected when Scott began to describe the substance of Teresa’s alleged threat; the court sustained the objection as hearsay and defense counsel did not argue the threat was non-hearsay.
The jury deadlocked 6-2 on whether the distress was "substantially caused" by Scott’s own conduct; after a verdict-urging instruction the jury convicted Scott of murder and he received 15 years to life.
On appeal Scott argued (1) the court erred in giving a verdict-urging instruction and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to argue the threat was non-hearsay; the court reversed and remanded based on ineffective assistance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by giving a verdict‑urging (Allen-style) instruction when jury reported an "absolute impasse"	Scott: instruction coerced verdict when jury was at absolute impasse	State: supplemental instruction appropriate to urge further deliberation	Court did not decide this issue (resolved on ineffective assistance grounds)
Whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Teresa's alleged threat was non‑hearsay and thus admissible	Scott: counsel should have argued the threat was offered to show its effect on him (non‑hearsay), central to EED defense; failure was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial	State: counsel may have had strategy to avoid admitting the exact words (risk that actual words could hurt defense); also argued jury heard threat generally	Court: counsel’s failure to argue non‑hearsay was deficient; prejudice shown because admitted testimony could have swayed holdout jurors and reasonably altered outcome; conviction reversed and case remanded for new trial

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes deficient-performance and prejudice standards for ineffective assistance)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference to counsel decisions; performance judged against objective reasonableness standard)
United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1985) (threats and verbal acts treated as nonhearsay when offered for effect on listener)
State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah 1980) (statements admissible to show their effect on defendants)
State v. White, 251 P.3d 820 (Utah 2011) (discussion of EED legal standard)