State v. Schriner, 303 Neb. 476

Deputy Kirkendall smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from Schriner’s house after neighbors complained; he knocked and Schriner answered in pajamas and admitted recent marijuana use.
Kirkendall asked Schriner to remain on the porch while he called the sheriff; Schriner was prohibited from reentering the house to prevent destruction of evidence.
Schriner initially refused consent to search, then—after discussing a warrant and after repeatedly seeking to reenter—invited Kirkendall inside; Schriner then led the deputy on a tour showing a marijuana grow, paraphernalia, and methamphetamine.
Schriner made numerous unsolicited, incriminating statements both before and after arrest; a few custodial-question responses (post-handcuffing) were suppressed by the district court for Miranda violations.
The district court denied suppression of most physical evidence and volunteered statements, concluding the porch encounter was not an unlawful seizure, most statements were not custodial interrogation, and consent to search was voluntary.
Schriner was convicted of manufacturing marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of methamphetamine; he appealed, arguing unlawful seizure, Miranda violations, and coerced consent.

Issue	Schriner’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether initial contact/seizure violated Fourth Amendment	Porch encounter became a de facto custodial arrest; he wasn’t free to leave	Encounter began as nonseizure and any temporary restraint was lawful to preserve evidence	Court: Early contact was tier‑one (nonseizure); temporary restraint on porch lawful and supported by probable cause/need to preserve evidence
Whether statements required Miranda warnings	Statements were elicited in custody or during custodial interrogation without warnings	Most statements were volunteered, not the product of interrogation; only limited post‑arrest questioning required suppression	Court: Most statements admissible as voluntary/spontaneous; limited custodial questions (post‑handcuff) suppressed per district court
Whether consent to search was voluntary	Consent was coerced by officer’s statement that a warrant would be obtained	Statement that a warrant could be sought is not coercive per se; totality shows voluntary consent	Court: Consent voluntary under totality; officer didn’t misrepresent having a warrant and consent valid
Whether physical evidence should be suppressed due to foregoing errors	Suppress evidence as fruit of unlawful seizure/interrogation/consent	Evidence obtained lawfully or via valid consent; only narrow Miranda exclusion applies	Court: Denied suppression of physical evidence; convictions affirmed

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes custody/interrogation warnings requirement)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (defines investigatory stop reasonable‑suspicion standard)
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (upheld temporary detention outside home while officers obtained a warrant to prevent destruction of evidence)
State v. Shiffermiller, 302 Neb. 245 (describes three tiers of police‑citizen encounters)
State v. Tucker, 262 Neb. 940 (officer statement about obtaining a warrant not coercive per se for consent analysis)
State v. Modlin, 291 Neb. 660 (consent voluntariness evaluated under totality of circumstances)