State v. Schriner, 303 Neb. 476

Deputy Kirkendall smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from Schriner’s house after reports from neighbors; he knocked and spoke with Schriner on the porch.
Schriner admitted to recently smoking marijuana and was told to remain on the porch while the deputy consulted the sheriff; Kirkendall refused Schriner’s request to re-enter the house.
Schriner initially refused consent to search, then volunteered that he had methamphetamine and later invited Kirkendall inside to “talk about it”; Kirkendall entered and Schriner led him through the home showing a grow operation and drugs.
After entry, Schriner was allowed to change clothes, make calls, smoke, and say goodbye to pets; he was then handcuffed, placed in a patrol vehicle, and officers seized marijuana plants, paraphernalia, and methamphetamine.
Schriner moved to suppress physical evidence and statements, arguing unlawful seizure (Fourth Amendment), failure to give Miranda warnings (Fifth Amendment), and coerced consent to search; the district court suppressed a narrow set of post-arrest answers but denied the remainder of the motion.
Bench trial resulted in convictions for manufacturing marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of methamphetamine; Schriner appealed the suppression rulings.

Issue	Schriner's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether initial encounter/seizure on porch violated Fourth Amendment	He was detained early and reasonably believed he was not free to leave	Contact began as a nonseizure and any restraint was temporary and justified by probable cause/evidence-preservation	No Fourth Amendment violation; temporary restraint to preserve evidence was lawful
Whether Miranda warnings were required for statements before arrest	Statements were obtained during custodial interrogation without Miranda	Statements were volunteered, not elicited by interrogation; Miranda not triggered pre-arrest	Miranda warnings not required pre-arrest; volunteered statements admissible; limited post-arrest questioning suppressed
Whether consent to search was voluntary	Consent was coerced by officer’s statements about obtaining/writing a warrant	Threat of obtaining a warrant is not coercive per se; totality shows voluntary consent	Consent was voluntary under totality; no coercion found
Whether suppression rulings warranted reversal of convictions	All evidence/statements should be suppressed due to constitutional violations	District court correctly admitted most evidence; only narrow suppression required	District court’s partial suppression affirmed; convictions upheld

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requires warnings before custodial interrogation)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (investigatory stops require reasonable suspicion)
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (temporary detention outside a home to preserve evidence pending a warrant can be lawful)
State v. Shiffermiller, 302 Neb. 245 (2019) (describing three tiers of police-citizen encounters)
State v. Tucker, 262 Neb. 940 (2001) (police statements about obtaining a warrant are not coercive per se in consent analysis)
State v. Modlin, 291 Neb. 660 (2015) (consent voluntariness evaluated under totality of the circumstances)