State v. Sawyer
297 Kan. 902
| Kan. | 2013Background
- Defendant Myoun L. Sawyer, a jail inmate, yelled death and assault threats at a civilian pizza deliverer (Saunders) while standing near a restricted line in a housing pod; deputies intervened and Sawyer continued yelling as deputies escorted him away.
- Sawyer was tried before District Judge John J. McNally; Sawyer had three prior cases before McNally, including one in which McNally recused (assault and battery), and another jury case where McNally’s demeanor drew appellate admonition.
- Sawyer moved to recuse McNally before trial; the judge declined, Sawyer filed an affidavit under K.S.A. 20-311d, the chief judge denied recusal, and trial proceeded resulting in conviction for criminal threat.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review on recusal and related issues.
- The Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding McNally’s failure to recuse violated due process; the Court also addressed (and approved) a permissive-inference jury instruction on intent but did not resolve a testimony-readback claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Judge McNally was required to recuse under K.S.A. 20-311d statutory standard | Sawyer argued prior recusal and other incidents (gag order, denying pro se filings, prior adverse rulings, pending civil suit against judge) showed statutory grounds | State/chief judge argued affidavit legally insufficient under statute; prior adverse rulings aren’t enough | Affidavit legally insufficient under statute; statutory recusal denied |
| Whether McNally’s failure to recuse violated the Due Process Clause | Sawyer argued his prior recusal by McNally and judge’s prior misconduct created a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias | State argued jury trial role differs from bench role and no Caperton-type constitutional interest present | Court held due process violated: prior judge-initiated recusal + recent demeanor/admonition created unacceptable probability of actual bias; reversal and remand required |
| Whether a permissive-inference instruction on intent (PIK Crim. 3d 54.01) was improper | Sawyer argued instruction risked shifting burden or lacked factual basis in this case | State argued instruction is longstanding, non-presumptive, and allowable when reasonably connected to facts | Court held instruction lawful, does not shift burden, and was factually supported by evidence (may be used on retrial) |
| Whether trial judge abused discretion by refusing jury readback of testimony (raised below) | Sawyer argued refusal impaired his trial rights | State defended trial court discretion on readback | Court did not decide this issue (moot on remand); not reached because case remanded on recusal |
Key Cases Cited
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (Due Process may require recusal where probability of actual bias is constitutionally intolerable)
- State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002 (2012) (standards for appellate review of recusal affidavits and due process analysis)
- State v. Schaeffer, 295 Kan. 872 (2012) (discussing recusal and due process frameworks)
- State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510 (1993) (permissive inference instruction does not relieve prosecution’s burden beyond a reasonable doubt)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (constitutional requirement that prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587 (2007) (adverse rulings alone do not require recusal)
- State v. Smith, 296 Kan. 111 (2012) (trial judge evidentiary discretion reviewed for abuse)