State v. Satterfield, 362 P.3d 728

Background

Defendant was tried before a judge on two counts: first-degree theft by receiving (Count 1) and unlawful possession of a short-barreled rifle (Count 2; pleaded guilty and not before the court on appeal).
ORS 164.095(1) criminalizes receiving property of another "knowing or having good reason to know" it was stolen; the indictment charged defendant with "knowingly" committing the theft.
At trial defendant testified he did not know the rifle was stolen when he acquired it; he acknowledged suspicious circumstances (price, condition) and later received a call alleging the rifle was stolen but said he did not find the caller credible until police told him.
Defense argued repeatedly below that the State failed to prove defendant actually "knew or believed" the rifle was stolen; defense did not expressly invoke the statutory phrase "good reason to know."
The trial court acquitted on actual knowledge but convicted, finding defendant had "good reason to know" the rifle was stolen both when he received it and after being told about the unreported theft.
On appeal the court considered (1) preservation of the argument that actual knowledge/belief is required under Korelis and (2) whether the trial court erred by relying on the lesser mental state.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendant preserved claim that ORS 164.095 requires actual knowledge or belief (not merely "good reason to know")	State: defendant failed to preserve that specific legal argument	Defendant: repeatedly argued below that State had to prove he "knew or believed" the property was stolen, which preserved the issue	Preserved — defendant’s repeated, specific argument about the required mens rea apprised court and opposing counsel
Correct culpable mental state for theft by receiving under ORS 164.095	State implicitly relied on statutory phrase including "good reason to know"	Defendant: Korelis requires actual knowledge or belief, not the objective "good reason to know" standard	Court: Korelis controls; conviction may only rest on actual knowledge or belief, so using "good reason to know" was legal error
Whether the trial court’s factual findings (that defendant did not actually know) compels outright reversal	State: trial court’s error does not require reversal if other evidence could support correct theory	Defendant: trial court expressly rejected actual knowledge and thus conviction must be reversed	Reversed and remanded for new trial on Count 1 — court did not resolve all material factual issues in defendant’s favor and there was sufficient evidence to retry
Remedy where conviction rested on erroneous legal theory	State: remand or other relief (implicit)	Defendant: outright reversal if court unambiguously resolved critical issues against him; otherwise new trial	Because the court left unresolved whether defendant believed or later knew the rifle was stolen, reversal and remand for a new trial and resentencing required

Key Cases Cited

State v. Korelis, 273 Or. 427, 541 P.2d 468 (Oregon 1975) (holding theft by receiving requires actual knowledge or belief the property was stolen)
Babler Bros. v. Pacific Intermountain, 244 Or. 459, 415 P.2d 735 (1966) (verdict or finding infected by incorrect law requires reversal)
State v. Thomas, 13 Or. App. 164, 509 P.2d 446 (1973) (appellate decision adopted by Korelis holding knowledge or belief is essential)
State v. Wilson, 240 Or. App. 475, 248 P.3d 10 (2011) (reversal required where legal error by trial court infects guilty finding despite sufficient evidence under correct law)
State v. Walker, 350 Or. 540, 258 P.3d 1228 (2011) (preservation principle: parties need not cite authorities by name; concise trial references can preserve issues)
State v. Barboe, 253 Or. App. 367, 290 P.3d 833 (2012) (if trial court unambiguously and incorrectly decides a critical issue, appellate court may reverse outright)