425 P.3d 807
Wash.2018Background
- Police stopped a Kia and found drugs, scales, multiple phones, and firearms; Adrian Sassen Van Elsloo was later charged with multiple felonies and firearm enhancements.
- Defense presented an alibi witness, Sharon Burton (a Lummi Nation counselor); after Burton testified, juror 12 told the bailiff she recognized Burton from limited, administrative contacts regarding the juror’s nephew.
- The prosecutor questioned juror 12 about any positive feelings toward Burton; juror 12 consistently denied a personal positive/negative bias and said any positive feeling was toward the tribal community’s services.
- The prosecutor moved to excuse juror 12 because Burton was a critical defense witness; the trial judge excused juror 12 midtrial despite lack of record evidence of actual bias.
- The jury convicted; on appeal, the Washington Supreme Court held the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing juror 12 and ruled on the appropriate remedy and, separately, on sufficiency of evidence for firearm enhancements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sassen Van Elsloo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an impaneled juror may be dismissed midtrial for prior acquaintance with a witness absent proof of actual bias | Trial judge may excuse juror as a precaution when a juror has connections to a critical witness | Juror 12 showed no actual bias and stated she could be fair; excusal required proof juror could not be impartial | Dismissal of an impaneled juror for bias requires proof juror formed a biased opinion and cannot set it aside (same standard as potential juror); here dismissal was an abuse of discretion because record showed no actual bias |
| Remedy for erroneous dismissal of an impaneled juror (midtrial, pre-deliberation) | Not argued in a single way; the State defended excusal as proper precaution | Erroneous excusal violated rights to impartial jury and unanimous verdict; defendant sought reversal and new trial | If erroneous dismissal may have stemmed from juror’s views on the merits, defendant is entitled to a new trial; if not, the State may avoid reversal by proving the error was harmless. Here reasonable possibility dismissal stemmed from juror’s views of the merits → new trial granted |
| Sufficiency of evidence for firearm enhancements | State: shotgun was readily accessible and connected to ongoing drug activity | Defendant: shotgun was too remote/unavailable and lacked nexus to drug activity | Court held evidence sufficient to support firearm enhancements (gun close to backpack with drugs, positioning, shell present, defendant linked to vehicle/drugs) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Elmore, 155 Wash.2d 758 (Wash. 2005) (holds deliberating juror cannot be dismissed where there is any reasonable possibility the dismissal stems from juror's views of the sufficiency of the evidence)
- State v. Noltie, 116 Wash.2d 831 (Wash. 1991) (voir dire equivocal answers insufficient to establish actual bias; trial court’s observation role emphasized)
- State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570 (Wash. 1995) (defendant has no right to particular juror; replacement with alternate not automatically constitutional error where procedures followed)
- State v. Gurske, 155 Wash.2d 134 (Wash. 2005) (distinguishes cases where weapon was inaccessible and no nexus to drug crime)
- State v. Eckenrode, 159 Wash.2d 488 (Wash. 2007) (firearm enhancements upheld where weapons were readily accessible and could be inferred to protect drug enterprise)