State v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 912

Background

State v. Santiago arose after P.A. 12-5 (2012) prospectively repealed Connecticut’s death penalty; the Connecticut Supreme Court (majority) held the death penalty unconstitutional under the state constitution’s due process clauses.
The court’s majority relied on a wide range of sources and factors (including sentencing trends, professional association opinions, rarity of imposition, delays, and racial disparities) that the defendant had not expressly raised and that were largely outside the trial record.
Chief Justice Rogers (joined by Justices Zarella and Espinosa) dissented from the denial of the state’s motion for argument and reconsideration, arguing the majority exceeded its role, addressed issues not litigated, and relied on extra‑record materials without giving the state notice or an opportunity to respond.
The state filed a motion (after the decision) seeking leave to submit supplemental briefing and to argue issues the majority had treated sua sponte; the majority denied that motion.
The dissent contends this denial violated basic due process (notice and opportunity to be heard), improperly overruled or revisited prior precedent (e.g., State v. Ross), and rested on misconstructions of legislative debate and statements by the Chief State’s Attorney.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Santiago)	Held
1) May the court decide constitutionality based on extra‑record materials and issues not raised by parties?	Court should not address unbriefed issues or extra‑record sources without giving state opportunity to respond; doing so denies due process.	Majority treated broader historical, comparative, and policy sources as properly informing evolving‑standards analysis.	Majority proceeded sua sponte; dissent says state was entitled to notice and argument and would have granted reconsideration.
2) Does Connecticut’s due process clause permit an ‘‘evolving standards of decency’’ inquiry that can invalidate legislatively authorized punishments?	State: preconstitutional tradition and due process codification meant courts should not substitute evolving‑standards review for legislative judgments; Ross should be reconsidered.	Defendant: evolving‑standards/decent‑mores analysis supports finding death penalty unconstitutional post‑P.A. 12‑5.	Majority applied evolving‑standards reasoning; dissent argued that approach departs from proper interpretation and precedents.
3) Has P.A. 12‑5 eliminated deterrence and retributive justifications (delays, risk of error) so death penalty is unconstitutional?	State: appellate safeguards and causes of delay justify system; delays and appellate review protect against error; evidence could rebut majority’s factual premises.	Defendant: lengthy delays, risk of irreversible error, and diminished retributive/penological value support invalidation.	Majority found penological/retributive justifications eroded; dissent held the state should have been allowed to contest those factual and policy conclusions.
4) Do prosecutorial discretion and sentencing practices render capital punishment arbitrary or racially biased?	State: no evidence of abuse of prosecutorial discretion in Connecticut; courts should not second‑guess charging decisions absent proof.	Defendant: discretion at charging and sentencing stages leads to uneven, non‑reserved application inconsistent with evolving standards.	Majority relied on concerns about unfettered discretion and disparities; dissent disputed reliance on untested extra‑record materials and lack of adversarial development.

Key Cases Cited

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (establishing judicial duty to interpret law)
Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123 (2014) (court may raise claims sua sponte only if parties are given opportunity to be heard)
Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198 (1995) (due process requires reasonable opportunity to be heard)
State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 (1994) (prior Connecticut ruling applying due process/evolving‑standards reasoning to punishment)
State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389 (1996) (courts rely on parties to frame issues; impartiality and adversarial process are critical)
State v. Lenarz, 301 Conn. 417 (2011) (dissent criticizing majority’s methodology when addressing unbriefed issues)
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (courts ordinarily rely on parties to frame issues for decision)