State v. Sanford, 2022 Ohio 3107

On Oct. 6, 2016 Andre Sanford ran a red light, struck and killed a motorcyclist; he admitted drinking and smoking marijuana and a blood sample was drawn.
Sanford was arrested and initially charged in municipal court with failure to stop after an accident and held in jail on felony charges; he accrued 95 days in custody before indictment.
Toxicology results, received weeks later, showed a prohibited level of marijuana metabolites; the grand jury returned an indictment adding per se OVI and aggravated-vehicular-homicide counts premised on OVI.
Sanford moved to dismiss all charges as violative of Ohio’s speedy-trial statute (R.C. 2945.71); the trial court dismissed some counts but denied dismissal of the per se OVI and related aggravated-homicide counts.
The Ninth District affirmed in part (upholding denial as to counts premised on per se OVI) and reversed as to counts that could have been charged without toxicology; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth District as to the per se OVI issue and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do toxicology-based per se OVI charges trigger a new speedy-trial period when results were not available at arrest?	State: toxicology were new facts unknown at arrest, so new speedy-trial clock begins when those charges were filed.	Sanford: speedy-trial time that ran from arrest should apply; toxicology not necessary because he admitted use.	Yes. Court held toxicology results were new information necessary to charge per se OVI, so those counts get a new speedy-trial period.
Are impaired-driving OVI and recklessness-based aggravated-homicide charges subject to the original speedy-trial period?	State: facts known at arrest supported these charges, so original period applies.	Sanford: same speedy-trial time should apply to all related charges.	No new clock. Court of appeals (affirmed by implication) found these counts could have been brought earlier and thus were governed by the original speedy-trial period (and were subject to dismissal).
Does a test result always restart the speedy-trial clock?	State: new factual discoveries can justify a new clock when necessary to charge the offense.	Sanford: test results should not automatically restart the clock; they were cumulative here.	Fact-specific rule: not automatic. New clock only when the state lacked all information necessary at the time of the initial charge.

State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108 (Ohio 1997) (new charges based on facts unknown at initial indictment may trigger a new speedy-trial period)
State v. Bonarrigo, 62 Ohio St.2d 7 (Ohio 1980) (time spent on dismissed related charges counts against later charges to prevent indefinite extensions)
State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67 (Ohio 1989) (when additional charges arise from same facts known at initial filing, the original speedy-trial period governs)
State v. Clay, 9 Ohio App.3d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (articulated test that additional charges are "known" if the state had all facts necessary at the time of the original charge)