State v. Sanders
445 P.3d 453
Utah2019Background
- Sanders, a convicted felon (Category II restricted person), was seen by police on his back porch holding a loaded rifle after a neighbor reported a disturbance; officers later seized the rifle and other weapons from the home.
- Sanders testified he was moving the girlfriend’s son’s rifle from the yard back into the house to secure it; officers believed he was intoxicated and conducted a safety sweep after learning a child might be inside.
- The State charged Sanders with three counts of possession of a firearm by a restricted person under Utah Code § 76-10-503(3); the jury convicted on one count and acquitted on two constructive-possession counts.
- At trial Sanders requested an "innocent possession" jury instruction: that a restricted person is not guilty if the firearm was innocently obtained, held for a benign purpose, and possession was transitory with prompt steps to rid oneself of it. The district court refused, finding no factual basis for the instruction.
- Sanders appealed; the Court reviewed whether the felon-in-possession statute implicitly or explicitly permits an innocent-possession defense, whether prior cases require recognition of such a defense, and whether refusing the instruction produced an absurd result.
Issues
| Issue | Sanders' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Utah Code § 76-10-503 contains an implicit "innocent possession" defense | Statute should be read to exclude transitory/innocent possession (e.g., returning a gun to its owner) from "possess" | Statute’s plain text and § 76-10-503(7) show Legislature deliberately limited exceptions; no room for an implicit defense | No implicit or explicit innocent-possession defense in § 76-10-503; statute bars possession by restricted persons absent the limited statutory exception |
| Whether prior cases (esp. State v. Davis and State v. Miller) require or support recognizing such a defense | Davis and Miller show Utah permits an innocent-possession instruction or analogous implied defense | Davis did not establish such a defense; Miller is distinguishable on textual grounds and relied on a different statutory scheme | Overrules any portion of Davis that could be read to create an innocent-possession affirmative defense; Miller is inapplicable here due to different statutory text and legislative guidance |
| Whether applying § 76-10-503 to brief/transitory possession would produce an absurd result warranting judicially implied defense or necessity | Brief transitory possession (e.g., securing a gun) is "without fault" and criminalizing it yields absurd/injust results | Legislature could rationally criminalize even brief possession by felons to effect clear, protective bright-line rule; no absurd result shown here | No absurd-results exception in this case; court suggests narrow hypothetical cases might be addressed by absurd-results analysis or necessity, but not by recognizing the broad instruction Sanders sought |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985) (upholds jury instruction defining possession/mens rea; did not establish affirmative innocent-possession defense)
- State v. Miller, 193 P.3d 92 (Utah 2008) (construed controlled-substances possession statute to exclude transient possession in some "innocent" scenarios)
- Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553 (Utah 2015) (framework for when to overrule precedent)
- State v. Willis, 100 P.3d 1218 (Utah 2004) (discusses legislative purpose of regulating firearm possession by felons)
- State v. Nielsen, 544 P.2d 489 (Utah 1975) (articulates purpose of felon-in-possession rule to deter previously violent offenders)
- United States v. Johnson, 459 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006) (federal discussion that felon-in-possession statutes reflect concern that danger may arise quickly)