476 P.3d 889
N.M.2020Background
- On December 18–19, 2017 police seized Gabriel Sanchez’s cell phone during a tribal-court-authorized search and obtained a warrant to search the phone on December 19, 2017.
- Initial forensic extraction at the RCFL failed because the phone was locked; the phone remained in police custody.
- On November 5, 2018 updated forensic tools unlocked the phone and agents copied its contents to an external drive; a second warrant to search the phone was obtained December 26, 2018 and the return stated a digital copy had been seized on November 5.
- Sanchez moved to suppress the phone data, arguing the extraction on November 5, 2018 violated Rule 5-211(C)’s ten-day execution requirement and that the December 19, 2017 warrant was stale; the district court granted suppression on the ten-day ground.
- The State appealed interlocutorily; the Supreme Court reversed suppression (holding Rule 5-211(C) was not violated) and affirmed the district court’s exclusion of evidence of a fire at the victim’s home (excluded under Rule 11-404(B) because the State lacked admissible evidence connecting Sanchez to the fire).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether extracting data from a seized cell phone 11 months after a warrant was issued violated Rule 5-211(C)’s 10-day execution requirement | The State: a warrant to search electronically stored information is "executed" when the device is seized or when on-site copying occurs; if the device was in police custody within 10 days, later off-site extraction is not barred | Sanchez: the extraction on Nov 5, 2018 occurred 11 months after the Dec 19, 2017 warrant, so the search was outside the 10-day execution window and thus warrantless | Held: Warrant is executed for Rule 5-211(C) purposes when the device is seized or on-site copied. Because Sanchez’s phone was lawfully seized and in police custody within 10 days of the warrant, later extraction did not violate Rule 5-211(C); suppression reversed |
| Whether evidence of a fire at the victim’s home was admissible under Rule 11-404(B) as other-act evidence | The State: the fire evidence was relevant to motive, intent, or plan and should be admitted under 11-404(B)(2) | Sanchez: the fire evidence was impermissible character evidence and the State lacked admissible proof linking him to the fire | Held: The district court did not abuse its discretion excluding the fire evidence because the State offered no admissible evidence connecting Sanchez to the fire (proffered link relied on inadmissible hearsay); exclusion affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (warrant generally required to search cell phones)
- United States v. Carrington, [citation="700 F. App'x 224"] (4th Cir. 2017) (delay in phone search did not violate federal execution rule where device already in custody)
- United States v. Huart, 735 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting warrant for phone may be executed when phone is seized)
- State v. Elam, 108 N.M. 268, 771 P.2d 597 (definition of when a warrant is executed)
- State v. Smallwood, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 (Supreme Court jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in life-sentence cases)
- State v. Rojo, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- State v. Malloy, 131 N.M. 222, 34 P.3d 611 (not all procedural-rule violations require suppression)
