436 P.3d 298
Utah Ct. App.2018Background
- In 2003 Samul pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual assault and attempted aggravated kidnapping pursuant to a written plea form that included the handwritten words: "CONCURRENT SENTENCES."
- No recording of the plea hearing exists; the plea form was the primary record of plea terms.
- At sentencing, AP&P recommended consecutive prison terms; defense counsel asked for concurrent prison terms but did not object when the prosecutor stated she would "not speak to the issue of consecutive and concurrent" as part of the plea bargain and otherwise urged prison.
- The district court imposed consecutive prison terms. Samul did not appeal at the time; years later procedural defects in appellate notice were remedied and Samul pursued a direct appeal.
- On appeal Samul argued (1) the State breached the plea bargain by failing to affirmatively argue for concurrent sentences and counsel/district court erred by not enforcing the bargain, and (2) the court plainly erred by imposing consecutive sentences without adequately considering statutory sentencing factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Samul) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State breached the plea agreement by not affirmatively arguing for concurrent sentences | The handwritten term "CONCURRENT SENTENCES" meant the State agreed to affirmatively advocate for concurrent sentences; failure to do so breached the plea | The phrase is ambiguous and reasonably read as only a promise not to oppose defendant's request for concurrency; no clear breach occurred | Court: Phrase is ambiguous; no plain error and counsel not ineffective for failing to object |
| Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's sentencing statements | Counsel should have enforced the plea bargain and objected to the State's failure to affirmatively seek concurrency | Given ambiguity in the plea, counsel reasonably could have believed State promised only to be silent on concurrency; strategic tolerance plausible | Court: No ineffective assistance — defendant failed to overcome presumption of adequate counsel |
| Whether the district court plainly erred by not addressing or enforcing an alleged plea-bargain breach at sentencing | Court should have required specific performance or other remedy when plea terms were misstated | District courts reasonably rely on attorneys to identify and litigate ambiguities; absent counsel objection, court’s reliance on parties’ statements was not obviously erroneous | Court: No plain error; district court acted within reason given ambiguity and counsel silence |
| Whether the court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without considering defendant's history, character, rehabilitative needs | Court ignored mitigating evidence and statutory factors required for consecutive sentencing | Pre-sentence report and counsel’s mitigation address those factors; court stated it reviewed the report and record supports assumption it considered the factors | Court: No plain error — presumption that sentencing court considered statutory factors was not rebutted |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gray, 372 P.3d 715 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (context and counsel silence may show no obvious breach of plea terms at sentencing)
- State v. Friel, 347 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (failure to alert court to alleged plea agreement discrepancy means breach was not obvious)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Helms, 40 P.3d 626 (Utah 2002) (presumption that sentencing court considered statutory factors; no requirement of express on-the-record findings)