State v. Samayoa
292 Neb. 334
| Neb. | 2015Background
- Defendant Maxiliamo Cano Samayoa (Cano) was tried by jury on four counts: one count of third-degree sexual assault of a child (count I, alleged "during the year 2008") and three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child (counts II–IV, variously alleging incidents in late 2010–2012).
- Victim P.L., Cano’s niece, testified to four separate incidents of sexual contact/penetration spanning her 7th–8th grade years through February 2012; she also briefly described a fifth uncharged incident.
- Cano denied the allegations, claimed he was never alone with P.L., and testified he lived in Texas in 2008.
- The jury convicted Cano on all four counts. The district court sentenced him to 1–3 years on the third-degree count and concurrent 35–40 year terms on each first-degree count; the court mistakenly announced a 25-year mandatory minimum before good-time eligibility.
- Cano appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence, erroneous admission of other-bad-acts evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2), and error in the court’s response to a jury question about the date alleged in count I.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Cano) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to support convictions | P.L.’s testimony alone was sufficient for a rational jury to find sexual penetration/contact and required ages beyond a reasonable doubt | Testimony was inconsistent and insufficient; some charged dates incompatible with Cano’s whereabouts | Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find elements of one third-degree and three first-degree counts proven beyond a reasonable doubt (sufficiency standard from State v. Dominguez applied) |
| Admission of testimony about an uncharged fifth incident (other bad acts) | Admission was proper / objection not preserved on §27-404(2) grounds | Trial court erred by admitting prior-bad-acts testimony without §27-404(2) safeguards | No reversible error: Cano objected at trial on materiality, not §27-404(2), so §27-404(2) claim not preserved for appellate review |
| Jury instruction/answer about alleged date in count I (whether exact date is element) | Instruction that exact time is not essential is a correct statement of law; jury may convict if elements proved even if exact date uncertain | Court’s supplemental answer conflicted with the written instruction alleging the offense "during the year 2008," allowing conviction despite alleged date and Cano’s asserted alibi (Texas 2008) | Affirmed: exact date/time is not an essential element of these offenses; supplemental answer was legally correct and not shown prejudicial |
| Sentencing mandatory-minimum error | State concedes trial court misstated mandatory minimum; correct statutory minimum is 15 years for first-offense first-degree child sexual assault | Trial court imposed or announced 25-year mandatory minimum (applying repeat-offender subsection) | Modified: reduce mandatory minimum before good-time eligibility from 25 to 15 years (statutory plain language requires previous conviction for 25-year minimum); otherwise sentences affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Dominguez, 290 Neb. 477 (appellate standard for sufficiency of evidence) (sets standard that appellate court will not reweigh credibility)
- State v. Wehrle, 223 Neb. 928 (time/date of offense not essential element unless statute so provides)
- State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597 (recognizing difficulty child victims often have identifying precise dates)
- Huffman v. Sigler, 352 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1965) (federal precedent that exact time generally not an element unless statute makes it so)