State v. Salvador Rodriguez
296 Neb. 950
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On July 23, 2014, officer Wackler responded to a domestic disturbance involving Lori Ezell at the residence rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano; Ezell had a key and stayed there occasionally and kept belongings there.
- Ezell reported later that day she and her child returned from a walk to find lights on, the garage open, and someone in the garage; she asked police to check the house.
- Officers entered the unlocked house to clear it for safety, found no persons, but observed firearms in plain view; while clearing a handgun they noticed the serial number appeared defaced.
- Based on the defaced firearm observations, officers obtained search warrants a week later and, pursuant to those warrants, found large quantities of methamphetamine under a basement couch (≈340 grams) and other drug items.
- At trial Rodriguez was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; he moved to suppress evidence as fruit of the initial warrantless entry, objected to testimony about his drug use as prior-bad-acts evidence, requested a limiting instruction, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether initial warrantless entry/search was lawful | Officers had reasonable grounds to believe a burglary/ intruder might be present (exigent circumstances) and entry to secure premises was justified | Warrantless entry violated Fourth Amendment; evidence was fruit of unconstitutional search | Search justified under emergency/burglary exigency; motion to suppress overruled |
| Whether Ezell’s testimony about Rodriguez’s drug use was improper Rule 404(2) evidence | Testimony was direct evidence of ongoing possession tied to charged offense (intrinsic), not other-acts propensity evidence | Testimony was prior-bad-acts and should have been excluded or admitted only under 404(3) | Admission was proper; testimony was intrinsic because possession was ongoing/continuing |
| Whether court erred by refusing a limiting instruction for the drug-use testimony | State: no limiting instruction required because testimony was intrinsic to charged possession | Rodriguez: lacking limiting instruction allowed jury to use evidence for improper propensity purposes | No error; limiting instruction unnecessary because evidence was not other-acts evidence |
| Whether prosecutor committed misconduct during closing (stating Rodriguez owned the house) | Any remark was not outcome-determinative; ownership was not material to elements and defense corrected it | Misstatement prejudiced jury by implying dominion/control supporting possession | Not reviewable on appeal (closing not in record); alternatively, any remark was not prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (Neb. 2006) (sets out emergency-doctrine elements and approach to exigent-entry analysis)
- State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 (Neb. 2017) (standard of appellate review for suppression rulings: factual findings for clear error, legal questions de novo)
- U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (continuous possession across dates is direct evidence of possession, not other-acts evidence)
- State ex rel. Zander v. District Court, 180 Mont. 548 (Mont. 1979) (officer may search interior areas where a burglar might hide when facts support reasonable belief of burglary)
- Hill v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 1 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (warrantless entry justified where door ajar and facts suggested possible burglary)
- State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (Neb. 2012) (distinguishes when evidence of earlier possession is other-acts versus direct evidence; discusses temporal connection to charged date)