State v. Salvador Rodriguez
296 Neb. 950
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On July 23, 2014, Officer Wackler responded to a domestic disturbance and drove Lori Ezell (a houseguest who had a key and kept belongings there) to the residence rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano.
- Ezell later called, reporting she saw someone in the garage, lights were on though she had locked up, and she was afraid to reenter; officers arrived and found the front door unsecured.
- Officers entered to clear the house for an intruder; they found a pistol with an altered serial number (and an apparent sawed-off shotgun in another closet) in plain view and handled the pistol for safety.
- Based on the defaced firearm(s), officers obtained search warrants a week later; searches pursuant to those warrants uncovered large quantities of methamphetamine under a basement couch and elsewhere.
- Rodriguez was charged with possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine and possession of a defaced firearm; he was convicted of the drug charge and acquitted of the firearm charge.
- At trial Ezell testified (without prior 404 notice) that she and Rodriguez used meth in the basement and that drugs were kept under the basement couch; defense objected and sought a limiting instruction which was denied; defense also alleged improper closing argument statements about ownership of the house but the record lacked a bill of exceptions for those remarks.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Rodriguez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether warrantless entry/search was lawful under exigent/emergency doctrine | Officers reasonably believed a burglary/ intruder might be present based on Ezell’s report and observable signs (lights on, door unsecured) | Search was nonconsensual and unreasonable; evidence seized was fruit of unlawful search | Warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances (possible burglary); suppression denied |
| Whether Ezell had common authority to consent to the officers’ initial entry | Ezell had key, lived/kept belongings there and said she had permission to stay, so officers reasonably believed she had common authority | Rodriguez disputed consent basis; argued no authority to allow entry that led to evidence | Court affirmed alternative ground that consent was reasonable but decision rested on exigency; no need to decide consent definitively |
| Admissibility of Ezell’s testimony about drug use and storage (Rule 404) | Testimony was intrinsic to charged continuing-possession offense (possession "on or about" date) and thus not 404 other-acts evidence | Testimony was prior-bad-acts evidence and prejudicial; should have been excluded or limited and jury instructed | Court held evidence was intrinsic (continuous possession) and admissible without limiting instruction |
| Prosecutorial remarks in closing about Rodriguez owning the house | Not applicable (State denies misconduct or asserts harmless) | Argues prosecutor misstated ownership and prejudiced jury; objected at trial and raised in new-trial motion | Court declined review because closing arguments were not in the bill of exceptions and supporting affidavits were not part of the record; no reversible misconduct shown |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (application of emergency doctrine and exigent-circumstances standards)
- U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.) (continuous possession makes earlier possession evidence intrinsic, not Rule 404(b) other-acts evidence)
- State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (discusses temporal connection and distinction between possession evidence and other-acts evidence)
- State v. Modlin, 291 Neb. 660 (standards for reviewing suppression rulings)