State v. Salvador Rodriguez
296 Neb. 950
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Police responded July 23, 2014 to a domestic disturbance involving Lori Ezell at a house rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano; Ezell had a key and stayed there intermittently with her children.
- Later that day Ezell called officers saying lights were on, doors/van were open, and she saw someone in the garage; officers found the front door unlocked and performed a warrantless sweep of spaces where a person could hide.
- During the sweep officers observed two firearms in plain view; one pistol’s serial number appeared defaced. Officers cleared the weapons for safety.
- Based on the observed defaced firearm, officers obtained search warrants a week later and found large quantities of methamphetamine under a basement couch and elsewhere; defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver.
- At trial Ezell testified (without pretrial notice or a 404(3) hearing) that she and Rodriguez used methamphetamine together in the basement and that drugs were kept under the couch; the court admitted this as intrinsic evidence and declined a limiting instruction.
- Defendant alleges the initial warrantless entry was unconstitutional, the drug-use testimony was improper prior-bad-acts evidence and prejudicial, and the prosecutor misstated that defendant owned the house during closing.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Rodriguez's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the initial warrantless entry/sweep was lawful (exigent circumstances) | Officers reasonably believed a burglary/ intruder might be present given Ezell’s report, lights on, and an unlocked/ajar door — emergency doctrine justified entry | Entry was nonconsensual and warrantless; no exigency justified searching the home | Warrantless sweep was reasonable under the emergency/burglary exigency doctrine; suppression denied |
| Whether Ezell had authority to consent to the sweep | Alternatively, Ezell had common authority to allow police to check the premises | Ezell lacked authority to consent as a transient guest | Court found it need not decide consent because exigency justified the entry (trial court had found consent alternative) |
| Admissibility of Ezell’s testimony about prior/simultaneous drug use (Rule 404) | Testimony was intrinsic to the charged continuing offense of possession and thus not "other acts"; no limiting instruction required | Testimony was prior-bad-acts evidence and required 404 notice, 404(3) hearing, and limiting instruction | Admission upheld: possession is a continuing offense; Ezell’s testimony was direct evidence of the charged offense, not 404(b) other-acts evidence |
| Prosecutorial remarks at closing (statement that defendant owned the house) | Any such comment was not misconduct and was not prejudicial because ownership was not dispositive | Prosecutor misstated that Rodriguez owned the house, prejudicing jury on possession/dominion | Not considered on appeal: closing argument record absent from bill of exceptions and affidavit not part of record; even assuming it occurred, court found no prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (2006) (describing emergency doctrine elements and scope)
- State ex rel. Zander v. District Court, 591 P.2d 656 (Mont. 1979) (officer reasonably searched interior where door unlocked after neighbor report of tampering)
- Hill v. Com., 441 S.E.2d 50 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (warrantless entry reasonable where door ajar and concern of burglary)
- United States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing facts insufficient to support warrantless entry)
- U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (continuous possession over time is direct evidence of possession charge, not "other acts")