State v. Salvador Rodriguez
296 Neb. 950
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On July 23, 2014, Officer Wackler responded to a domestic disturbance involving Lori Ezell at a house rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano; Ezell said she had a key and stayed there occasionally with her children.
- Later that day Ezell returned from a walk, believed someone was in the garage, and called police; officers found the front door unlocked/ajar and lights on.
- Officers entered without a warrant to check for an intruder, cleared the house, and observed two firearms in plain view; while checking the pistol for safety they noticed the serial number had been defaced.
- Based on the defaced firearm observations, officers obtained a search warrant on July 30, 2014; subsequent searches (two warrants) uncovered approximately 340 grams of methamphetamine under a basement couch and other places.
- At trial Ezell testified (without pretrial notice by the State under Neb. Evid. R. 404(2)) that she and Rodriguez used methamphetamine together in the basement and that the drugs were kept under the couch; defense objected but court admitted the testimony as intrinsic to the charged possession.
- Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; he appealed arguing (1) the initial warrantless entry/search was unlawful, (2) admission of prior drug-use testimony was improper and lacked a limiting instruction, and (3) prosecutorial misconduct in closing remarks claiming he owned the house.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawfulness of warrantless entry/search | Entry justified by exigent circumstances (possible burglary/intruder) and thus evidence observed supported later warrants | Entry was nonconsensual and unreasonable; suppression required because no warrant | Warrantless entry was reasonable under the emergency/burglary-in-progress doctrine; suppression denied |
| Admission of Ezell’s testimony about shared meth use | Testimony was direct, intrinsic evidence of continuing possession tied to charged date | Testimony was prior bad-acts evidence under Neb. Evid. R. 404(2) and required notice/limiting instruction | Testimony treated as intrinsic to a continuing-possession offense, admissible; no limiting instruction required |
| Lack of limiting jury instruction on drug-use testimony | Not applicable (State viewed testimony as intrinsic) | Absence of instruction prejudiced defendant by allowing propensity inference | No error: evidence was part of the charged offense, so limiting instruction was not required |
| Prosecutorial comment that defendant “owned” the house in closing | Comment (if made) was not prejudicial; ownership not decisive | Comment was misconduct and prejudicial because ownership bears on possession control | Not reviewed on merits—closing arguments not in record/bill of exceptions; on the record, any alleged remarks did not warrant relief |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (Neb. 2006) (sets out emergency doctrine elements and review standard for exigent-circumstances searches)
- State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 (Neb. 2017) (two-part standard for appellate review of Fourth Amendment suppression rulings)
- U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (continuous possession can make evidence on other dates intrinsic to charged possession)
- State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (Neb. 2012) (discusses distinction between other-acts evidence and direct evidence of possession)