State v. Salvador Rodriguez, 296 Neb. 950

Defendant Henry O. Salvador Rodriguez was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver (on or about July 30, 2014) and possession of a defaced firearm; convicted on the drug count and acquitted on the firearm count.
Police initially entered the house without a warrant after a houseguest (Lori Ezell) called reporting lights on, an open garage, and that she thought she saw someone inside; officers searched places a person could hide and discovered firearms in plain view (one with an altered serial number).
Based on the defaced firearm observations, officers later obtained search warrants (July 30 and August 2) and seized roughly 340 grams of methamphetamine from under a basement couch and other locations.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to those warrants as fruit of the initial warrantless search; the trial court denied suppression, finding exigent circumstances (possible burglary) and alternative consent by Ezell.
At trial, Ezell testified (without prior notice or a 404(b) hearing) that she and defendant used methamphetamine in the basement and that defendant kept drugs under the basement couch; defense objected but the court admitted the testimony as intrinsic evidence and declined to give a limiting instruction.
Defendant claimed prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument (allegedly stating defendant owned the house); closing argument was not part of the record and the new-trial affidavit was not made part of the bill of exceptions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of initial warrantless entry/search	Entry was justified by exigent circumstances (possible burglary in progress)	Warrantless entry was unreasonable; evidence is fruit of illegal search	Court affirmed: facts supported reasonable belief of burglary; exigency justified limited search
Consent to search	Ezell had common authority to consent because she lived there and had a key	Defendant disputed Ezell's authority to permit entry/search	Court need not resolve consent because exigency alone justified search (alternative consent finding upheld by trial court)
Admission of Ezell's testimony about past drug use	Testimony was intrinsic to charged continued possession (possession is a continuing offense)	Testimony was other-acts evidence under Neb. Evid. R. 404(2) and required notice/limiting instruction	Court held testimony was direct/intrinsic evidence of possession around charged date; admission was not error; no limiting instruction required
Prosecutorial remarks in closing (ownership of house)	Statements did not prejudice defendant; ownership not dispositive	Statements misstated facts and prejudiced jury; warranted new trial	Court declined to consider because remarks not in record and affidavit was not made part of bill of exceptions; no reviewable error

State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 716 N.W.2d 671 (Neb. 2006) (sets out emergency-doctrine exigency test and standards for warrantless entry)
State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941, 893 N.W.2d 411 (Neb. 2017) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
Hill v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 1, 441 S.E.2d 50 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (officers reasonably entered when door ajar and circumstances suggested burglary)
United States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980) (warrantless entry unreasonable where facts did not support belief a burglary was in progress)
United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (continuous possession makes earlier possession evidence intrinsic, not other-acts evidence)
State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179, 817 N.W.2d 277 (Neb. 2012) (discusses when evidence of prior possession may be intrinsic vs. other-acts)