State v. Salvador Rodriguez, 296 Neb. 950

On July 23, 2014, Officer Wackler responded to a domestic disturbance involving Lori Ezell, who said she was staying in a house rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano while they were out of town and had a key and bedroom there.
Ezell called the officer later, frightened that an intruder was inside after she and her child returned from a walk and observed lights on, an open garage, and her van doors open.
Officers entered the unlocked house to check for an intruder, cleared areas where a person could hide, and observed two firearms in plain view; while checking the handgun for safety they noticed a defaced serial number.
A warrant was later obtained based on the defaced firearms; searches under that warrant (and a subsequent warrant) uncovered large quantities of methamphetamine under a basement couch.
Rodriguez was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of a defaced firearm; convicted of the drug charge and acquitted of the firearm charge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Rodriguez)	Held
Was the initial warrantless entry/search unreasonable?	Entry was justified by exigent circumstances (possible burglary/intruder) or by consent via Ezell.	Warrantless entry violated Fourth Amendment; officers lacked reasonable grounds for exigency and Ezell lacked authority to consent.	The search was reasonable under the emergency doctrine; exigent circumstances (possible burglary) justified the entry.
Were Ezell's statements about Rodriguez's drug use inadmissible other-acts (Rule 404)?	Testimony was intrinsic to the charged continuing possession offense, not other-acts evidence.	Evidence was prior-bad-acts and should have been excluded or admitted only under Rule 404 procedures.	Admission was proper: possession was a continuing offense and Ezell's testimony was direct evidence of the charged crime.
Should the court have given a limiting instruction about the drug-use testimony?	Not necessary because the evidence was intrinsic, not propensity evidence.	Lack of a limiting instruction prejudiced Rodriguez by permitting propensity use.	No error: evidence was intrinsic; limiting instruction not required.
Were prosecutor's alleged closing remarks (that Rodriguez owned the house) misconduct?	Any statement was harmless; ownership was not dispositive.	Remarks (not in record) misstated ownership and prejudiced jury.	Not reviewed: remarks are not in the record/bill of exceptions; affidavit on motion for new trial not considered.

State v. Eberly, 716 N.W.2d 671 (Neb. 2006) (defines emergency doctrine factors for warrantless entry)
State v. Freemont, 817 N.W.2d 277 (Neb. 2012) (discusses distinction between intrinsic possession evidence and other-acts evidence)
U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding continuous possession over time is direct evidence of charged possession)
State ex rel. Zander v. District Court, 591 P.2d 656 (Mont. 1979) (officer reasonably believed burglary in progress based on reports and unlocked door)
Hill v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 50 (Va. App. 1994) (warrantless entry reasonable where door ajar and neighbor report suggested possible burglary)
United States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980) (contrasting case where facts did not support warrantless entry)