State v. Salvador Rodriguez
296 Neb. 950
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On July 23, 2014, police responded to a domestic disturbance involving Lori Ezell, who said she was staying at the home of Salvador Rodriguez and had a key and a bedroom there while the owners were out of town.
- Ezell returned from a walk, saw lights on, the garage open, and believed someone was in the garage; she asked Officer Wackler to check the house for an intruder.
- Officers entered the unlocked house, cleared areas where a person could hide, and observed two firearms in plain view; while clearing a handgun for safety they discovered its serial number appeared defaced.
- Based on those observations, officers obtained search warrants a week later and executed searches that yielded large quantities of methamphetamine (about 340 grams) under a basement couch and elsewhere.
- At trial Rodriguez was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; he moved to suppress evidence from the initial warrantless entry, objected to testimony about his drug use as prior-bad-acts evidence, and alleged improper prosecutorial remarks during closing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Rodriguez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Validity of warrantless entry/search | Entry was justified by exigent circumstances (possible burglary/intruder) | Warrantless entry into home was unreasonable, so evidence is fruit of unconstitutional search | Court held exigent circumstances justified entry; suppression denied |
| 2. Consent to entry | Ezell had common authority to allow officers to enter | Ezell lacked authority to consent; entry therefore unlawful | Court affirmed entry need not be addressed because exigency alone justified search (alternative consent finding upheld by trial court) |
| 3. Admission of testimony about prior drug use | Testimony about ongoing drug use at the house was direct evidence of the charged possession (continuous possession) | Testimony was prior-bad-acts propensity evidence under Neb. Evid. R. 404(2) and required notice/limiting instruction | Court held the evidence was intrinsic (continuous possession) and admissible; no limiting instruction required |
| 4. Prosecutorial remarks in closing (house ownership) | Any remark that Rodriguez owned the house was harmless; ownership not dispositive | Prosecutor misstated facts and prejudiced the jury; trial counsel preserved error | Court refused to consider alleged remarks because closing argument was not in record/bill of exceptions; no reviewable error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (discusses emergency doctrine/exigent circumstances and objective-reasonableness standard)
- State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 (standard of review for suppression rulings: historical facts for clear error, legal questions de novo)
- U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.) (continuous possession: evidence of possession on dates other than charged date can be direct evidence, not other-acts)
- State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (addresses when possession evidence is treated as other-acts versus intrinsic; discussed limiting scope)
- Hill v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 1 (Va. Ct. App.) (officers may enter without warrant to check for burglary/intruder where door ajar and occupant absent)
