State v. Salvador Rodriguez, 296 Neb. 950

Background

On July 23, 2014, Officer Wackler responded to a domestic disturbance involving Lori Ezell, who said she was staying at a house rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano and had a key and a bedroom there.
Later that day Ezell called the officer saying lights were on, the garage door was open, and she believed someone was inside; officers arrived, found the front door not fully latched, and conducted a safety sweep of areas where a person could hide.
During the sweep officers observed in plain view a pistol with an altered/defaced serial number and a sawed-off shotgun; they cleared the pistol for safety and then left the premises and returned the keys to Ezell.
Based on the defaced firearms observed during that warrantless sweep, officers obtained search warrants on July 30 and August 2; those warrant searches recovered large quantities of methamphetamine (≈340 grams) under the basement couch and elsewhere.
At trial Ezell testified (without pretrial notice under Neb. Evid. R. 404) that she and Rodriguez used methamphetamine together and that the drug was kept under the basement couch; the jury convicted Rodriguez of possession with intent to deliver and acquitted on defaced firearm charge.
Rodriguez appealed, arguing (1) the initial warrantless entry/search was unconstitutional, (2) Ezell’s testimony was prejudicial prior-bad-acts evidence admitted without proper 404 procedure or limiting instruction, and (3) prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument regarding ownership of the house.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the initial warrantless entry/search was lawful under the emergency (exigent) doctrine	State: officers reasonably believed a burglary/occupant-danger emergency existed given Ezell’s report, lights on, and unlocked/ajar door	Rodriguez: facts did not support reasonable belief of an immediate emergency to justify warrantless entry	Court: affirmed—facts objectively supported exigent circumstance (possible burglary) so entry/search was reasonable
Whether Ezell’s testimony about shared meth use was inadmissible other-acts evidence under Neb. Evid. R. 404(2)	State: testimony was direct evidence of ongoing possession connected to charged date, not prior bad acts	Rodriguez: testimony was prior-bad-acts propensity evidence admitted without Rule 404(3) hearing or notice	Court: affirmed—possession is a continuing offense; testimony was intrinsic/direct to charged possession, not 404 other-acts evidence
Whether a limiting instruction was required for Ezell’s testimony	State: no limiting instruction necessary because testimony was intrinsic to the crime charged	Rodriguez: absence of limiting instruction allowed propensity use and prejudiced jury	Court: affirmed—no limiting instruction required because evidence was not other-acts evidence
Whether prosecutor committed misconduct in closing by saying Rodriguez owned the house	State: disputed but, even if said, ownership was not material and did not prejudice verdict	Rodriguez: prosecutor misstated ownership and defense was prejudiced	Court: affirmed—closing argument record absent from bill of exceptions; affidavit not properly preserved; no reversible misconduct shown

Key Cases Cited

State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 (standard of review for suppression rulings)
State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (defining emergency doctrine/exigent-circumstances elements)
State v. Perry, 292 Neb. 708 (police entry into home requires exigent circumstances absent warrant)
U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (possession over time may be intrinsic evidence rather than other-acts evidence)
State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (discussion of temporality and other-acts analysis in possession contexts)
State v. Parnell, 294 Neb. 551 (trial court discretion on admissibility of other-acts evidence)