State v. Salvador Rodriguez
296 Neb. 950
Neb.2017Background
- On July 23, 2014, Officer Wackler responded to a domestic dispute involving Lori Ezell and drove her to a house rented by Salvador Rodriguez and Rosa Anguiano; Ezell had a key and stayed there intermittently with her children.
- Ezell later reported she and her child returned from a walk to find lights on, a garage door open, and someone she thought was in the garage; she asked police to check for an intruder.
- Officers entered the unlocked house, cleared areas where a person could hide, and observed two firearms in plain view; one pistol’s serial number appeared defaced.
- Based on those observations, officers obtained warrants on July 30 and August 2 to search the house; searches pursuant to those warrants uncovered large quantities of methamphetamine under a basement couch and elsewhere.
- Rodriguez was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of a defaced firearm; he moved to suppress evidence seized after the initial warrantless entry and objected to admission of testimony about his prior drug use and certain alleged closing-argument remarks.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Rodriguez's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether initial warrantless entry was lawful (exigent circumstances) | Officers reasonably believed a burglary/ intruder might be present based on Ezell’s report, lights on, and unlocked door | Warrantless entry was unreasonable; no exigency justified nonconsensual entry | Warrantless entry justified under emergency/burglary exigency; suppression denied |
| Whether Ezell had authority to consent to entry | (Alternative) Ezell had common authority as houseguest with key and possessions | Ezell lacked authority to consent to full search | Court did not reach this alternative because exigency resolved the issue (trial court had found consent but appellate decision rests on exigency) |
| Admissibility of Ezell’s testimony about drug use and stash under couch (Rule 404) | Testimony was direct/intrinsic to charged possession (continuing possession) and thus admissible without 404 limiting instruction | Testimony was prior bad-acts/propensity evidence and required 404 procedures and limiting instruction | Testimony was intrinsic to a continuing possession offense; admission without limiting instruction not error |
| Alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing (statement that Rodriguez owned the house) | Any remark was not prejudicial; ownership not dispositive | Prosecutor misstated ownership, prejudicing jury; objection sustained below | Error claim not considered — closing argument not in record/bill of exceptions; alternate record remedy not preserved |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 (Neb. 2017) (standard of review for Fourth Amendment suppression rulings)
- State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893 (Neb. 2006) (emergency doctrine elements and review standard)
- State v. Modlin, 291 Neb. 660 (Neb. 2015) (suppression review principles)
- State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (Neb. 2012) (discussion of possession evidence and distinction between intrinsic evidence and other-acts evidence)
- U.S. v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980) (contrast where facts did not support warrantless entry for suspected burglary)
- U.S. v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (possession over time is continuous; evidence of possession on dates other than the charged date can be intrinsic to the charged offense)