State v. S.S., 162 A.3d 1058

Defendant (S.S.) was interrogated on videotape by Hudson County investigators after an allegation his young daughter had been sexually abused; interrogation lasted over an hour with breaks and increasingly accusatory questioning.
During the interrogation defendant twice said phrases like “No, that’s all I got to say. That’s it,” and later “No” and “I don’t want to talk about it.” Investigators continued questioning and obtained admissions.
At a pretrial Miranda suppression hearing the trial judge—relying solely on the video—found defendant unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent at the point he said “that’s all I got to say” and suppressed subsequent statements.
The Appellate Division, citing State v. Diaz‑Bridges, conducted a de novo review of the same video, credited defendant’s calm tone, reversed the suppression, and admitted the post‑invocation statements.
The Supreme Court granted certification to decide (1) the proper standard of appellate review when factual findings rest solely on a recorded interrogation, and (2) whether defendant invoked his right to remain silent; it reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated suppression.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (S.S.)	Held
Standard of appellate review for factual findings based solely on video	Diaz‑Bridges permits de novo appellate factfinding because video is equally available	Trial court findings should be given deferential review (clearly erroneous standard) even if based only on video	Trial court factual findings get deferential review; Diaz‑Bridges is overruled on this point
Whether defendant invoked right to remain silent by saying “That’s all I got to say. That’s it.”	Words plus calm tone indicate he meant he had no more to add, not an invocation	The phrase was an unambiguous invocation; if ambiguous, officers had duty to clarify or stop	Trial court reasonably found an invocation; subsequent statements suppressed
Role of suspect’s tone/demeanor in assessing invocation	Tone and flow of conversation are relevant and can negate a plain‑language invocation	Reliance on tone is subjective and risks cultural/racial bias; words should control	Tone/demeanor may be considered but do not trump clear words; here words + context supported invocation
Remedy when invocation is ambiguous	Appellate court may reweigh video and decide independently	If ambiguous, officers must stop or clarify; ambiguity favors suppression	If ambiguity exists, officers must stop or ask narrow clarifying questions; here investigators failed to honor/clarify invocation

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishing Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation protections)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (police must scrupulously honor invocation of right to cut off questioning)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (Miranda invocation must be unambiguous under federal law)
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (appellate deference to trial factfinders; clearly erroneous standard)
State v. Diaz‑Bridges, 208 N.J. 544 (court previously allowed de novo review of video‑based factual findings — reconsidered and limited here)
State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123 (New Jersey requires diligent honoring of even ambiguous requests to terminate questioning)
State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 (trial court’s video‑based factfindings entitled to deference when supported by record)
State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (appellate courts must uphold trial factual findings supported by sufficient credible evidence)