State v. S.S. (077486) (Hudson and Statewide), A-84-15

Background

Defendant was videotaped after being Mirandized and signing a waiver; interrogation lasted over an hour with a 49‑minute break and a second detective (Kolich) joining about 40 minutes in.
The charged conduct involved defendant's then‑four‑year‑old daughter's allegation that he put his penis in her mouth; defendant initially denied culpability throughout the interview.
During questioning, defendant made short denials, asked to use the bathroom (request denied briefly), and had his cell phone taken and placed out of reach.
At one point Kolich pressed emotionally (e.g., "there’s something inside you…you’re fighting it"); defendant answered, "No, that's all I got to say. That's it." Questioning continued after that exchange and after the 49‑minute break defendant again answered "No" when asked if he had anything to tell them; shortly thereafter he spontaneously confessed.
Defendant moved to suppress, arguing he had invoked his right to remain silent; the trial court granted suppression, finding his statements constituted a clear invocation and detectives failed to clarify or cease questioning.
The Appellate Division reviewed the videotape de novo, concluded defendant did not clearly invoke his right to silence, and reversed the suppression order.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendant invoked his Miranda right to remain silent during interrogation	The State argued the interrogation must continue unless invocation is clear; defendant’s brief denials did not clearly invoke silence	Defendant argued that uttering "that's all I got to say/that's all I can say" and repeated silences amounted to an invocation requiring cessation	The court held defendant did not clearly invoke the right; his words reflected denial, not invocation, so suppression was reversed
Whether officers were required to clarify ambiguous statements	State: Officers need only clarify when invocation is genuinely ambiguous	Defendant: Officers had duty to clarify and stop when suspect indicated unwillingness to continue	Court found, after viewing tape, statements were unambiguous denials, not ambiguous invocations, so no duty to cease was triggered
Whether post‑break interrogation required re‑Mirandizing or cessation	State: Continuation without re‑Mirandizing violated Miranda protections	Defendant: Break + prior statements meant waiver was revoked and interrogation should have stopped	Court held the totality showed waiver persisted; resumption did not violate Miranda
Whether the totality of circumstances supported voluntariness of confession	State: Videotape and demeanor show voluntary confession beyond reasonable doubt	Defendant: Officers’ conduct (denied restroom briefly, cell phone taken, repeated pressure) was coercive	Court concluded confession was voluntary and State met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (established Miranda right to remain silent and right to counsel)
State v. Diaz‑Bridges, 208 N.J. 544 (Appellate court may independently review recorded interrogations; officers must clarify ambiguous invocations)
State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412 (standard of review for suppression orders; accept trial court factual findings unless clearly mistaken)
State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (statements like "nothing else to say" can constitute invocation of the right to remain silent and must be scrupulously honored)
State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16 (State bears burden to prove waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary)
State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (discusses waiver standard and totality of circumstances)