State v. S.B. (077519) (Somerset County and Statewide), A-95-15

Background

Defendant S.B., a church congregant, had prior sexual-assault convictions requiring Megan’s Law registration and restrictions.
S.B. informed his church (Eternal Life Christian Center, ELCC) of his convictions and volunteered in the church’s No Limits Youth Ministry (NLYM) supervising youths aged 12–17.
A grand jury indicted S.B. under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-23 for prohibited participation in a “youth serving organization.”
Trial court dismissed the indictment, finding the statute vague as to religious organizations and treating the NLYM as part of the church and thus outside the definition.
The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning the Legislature did not intend to include religious organizations within the statutory definition.
The Supreme Court granted certification, held the statutory definition unambiguous, reversed the Appellate Division, reinstated the indictment, and remanded for factual determination by a jury.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a youth ministry affiliated with a church is a “youth serving organization” under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22	The statutory definition’s broad “any other corporation, association or organization” includes church-affiliated youth ministries; children in religious settings need same protection	NLYM is part of ELCC (a religious organization) and therefore falls outside the definition; statute is ambiguous as to religious organizations	The statute is plain: churches and their youth ministries are not categorically exempt; issue of whether NLYM meets the definition is for the jury
Whether the school-exclusion analysis in State v. J.B.W. compels exempting religious affiliates	State: J.B.W. shows separate entities can be covered, not that religious affiliates are excluded	S.B.: unlike the pit crew in J.B.W., NLYM is not separate from its sponsoring organization and religious groups should be treated differently	J.B.W. is distinguishable; Legislature expressly excluded only public and nonpublic schools, not religious organizations
Whether statutory ambiguity or legislative history supports a religious exemption	State: even if unclear, legislative intent favors broad child-protection scope	S.B.: omission of religious organizations from the definition and other statutory references implies they were not meant to be included	Court finds statutory language unambiguous; legislative purpose further supports including religious organizations within coverage
Whether Free Exercise concerns require interpreting the statute to exclude religious organizations	State: not raised; protection goals prevail	S.B.: implied Free Exercise problem if statute applies to churches	Court declines to reach constitutional Free Exercise issues; statutory interpretation dispositive

Key Cases Cited

State v. J.B.W., 434 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 2014) (analyzed when an organization affiliated with a school falls outside school exclusion)
Febbi v. Bd. of Review, 35 N.J. 601 (1961) (courts bound by legislative definitions)
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) (start statutory interpretation with plain language)
State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222 (2010) (use statute’s structure when construing legislative intent)
State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480 (2015) (courts may not rewrite plainly written statutes)
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1 (1986) (examples of non-exhaustive statutory lists)
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (statutory language indicating non-exclusivity of a following list)