State v. Ryce
303 Kan. 899
| Kan. | 2016Background
- Ryce was arrested for DUI after officer observed impairing driving and odor of alcohol; license suspended; car tags mismatched.
- At jail, Ryce received implied-consent notice under 8-1001(k) and refused a breath test; testing did not occur.
- State charged Ryce with 8-1025(a) for test refusal and three misdemeanors; district court dismissed the 8-1025 charge and others without prejudice.
- Ryce argued 8-1025 criminalizes the exercise of his Fourth Amendment right to withdraw consent; argued unconstitutional under Fourth and Kansas Constitution, and due process.
- Issue presented: whether 8-1025 is facially unconstitutional; court must interpret 8-1025 and 8-1001; consider whether the Fourth Amendment applies and how Patel affects facial challenges.
- Court holds 8-1025 facially unconstitutional because it criminalizes withdrawal of implied consent in a way that chills Fourth Amendment rights; explains need for narrowly tailored approach.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 8-1025 violate the Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment by punishing withdrawal of consent? | Ryce argues 8-1025 punishes a constitutionally protected withdrawal of consent. | State contends implied consent and other exceptions justify penalties for noncompliance with testing. | Yes; 8-1025 facially unconstitutional. |
| Is implied consent irrevocable under the Fourth Amendment framework? | Ryce asserts consent implied by 8-1001 can be withdrawn; irrevocability not required. | State argues implied consent is irrevocable under certain authorities. | Irrevocability rejected; consent may be withdrawn. |
| Does Patel limit facial challenges to 8-1025's text alone? | Ryce relies on Patel to focus on statute's plain text without considering other grounds. | State argues other warrant exceptions could justify searches, so statute may be valid in some contexts. | Patel directs focus to the statute's text and actual applications; 8-1025 unconstitutional on its face. |
| Is 8-1025 narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests (public safety, deterrence) under strict scrutiny? | Ryce contends statute is not narrowly tailored and chills constitutional rights. | State asserts compelling interests and argues alternative constitutional mechanisms exist. | Not narrowly tailored; violates strict scrutiny; unconstitutional. |
| May the State punish test-refusal under nonconsensual-search theories post-McNeely? | Ryce argues post-McNeely rejects per se warrant-exceptions to justify testing without consent. | State suggests other warrant-exceptions could justify testing without consent. | Court scrutinizes but ultimately rejects broad nonconsensual grounds; relies on Patel and 8-1001 structure. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. (1973)) (consent must be voluntary; totality of circumstances governs validity)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. (1966)) (bodily intrusions require narrow, limited conditions; emergency exception)
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (U.S. (1989)) (breath/urine testing implicated privacy; special needs not always apply)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. (2013)) (no per se exigency; warrant should be sought when feasible; case-by-case exigeny)
- Patel v. Los Angeles, 576 U.S. 576 (U.S. (2015)) (facial challenges guided by statute's actual applications, not hypothetical scenarios)
- State v. Murry, 271 Kan. 223 (2001) (Fourth Amendment implicated in bodily invasions; 8-1001 context)
- State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71 (2005) (breath test as search subject to Fourth Amendment)
- State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 566 (1980) (withdrawal of implied consent recognized; consent can be refused)
- Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (U.S. (1946)) (contractual inspection agreements distinguishable from implied consent)
- Earls v. Board of Ed., 536 U.S. 822 (U.S. (2002)) (special needs doctrine; school context; not directly controlling here)