State v. Ryan M. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498

Background

On May 6, 2014, Ryan Rawlings entered a Wal‑Mart, placed merchandise (a large tote filled with items and a floor lamp) in a cart, and attempted to leave via self‑checkout without paying; loss prevention stopped him in the parking lot.
A deputy gave Miranda warnings, asked about prior thefts, and Rawlings said he had shoplifted from Wal‑Mart in Ohio and “always got away with it.”
Rawlings was charged with petit theft (misdemeanor) and burglary (felony); petit theft was later dismissed and burglary was tried to a jury, which convicted him.
Pretrial, defense moved to dismiss the burglary charge as violating the Equal Protection and First Amendment clauses; the trial court denied the motion.
The prosecutor filed a Rule 404(b) notice of intent to use Rawlings’s statement about prior thefts; the trial court admitted that testimony for intent and instructed the jury to consider it only for intent, not character.
Rawlings appealed, challenging (1) the burglary statute under Equal Protection and First Amendment theories, and (2) admission of his prior‑theft statement under I.R.E. 404(b)/403 and the notice requirement.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Equal Protection: Does applying burglary statute to shoplifting in open retail spaces deny equal protection?	Rawlings: statute penalizes those who enter open stores with intent to commit petit theft but not those who hope to find stealable property outdoors — disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.	State: persons entering structures are not similarly situated to persons prowling outdoors; legislature may criminalize entry into stores to curb shoplifting.	Court upheld statute as applied; defendants not similarly situated and legislative choice is permissible.
First Amendment: Does criminalizing entry with intent punish thoughts/speech and chill speech?	Rawlings: the intent element punishes “bad thoughts” and could chill speech (e.g., public advocacy of shoplifting).	State: intent elements and use of speech as evidence are constitutional; deterrent hypothesis is speculative and stores can exclude patrons.	Court rejected First Amendment challenge; intent crimes are not thought‑crime and speech can be used as evidence of intent.
Evidence Rule 404(b)/403 & notice: Was admission of Rawlings’s statement about prior Wal‑Mart thefts improper (untimely notice, relevance, unfair prejudice)?	Rawlings: 404(b) notice untimely and probative value outweighed by unfair prejudice; lack of proof prior thefts occurred.	State: notice was provided before trial, statement relevant to intent, probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice; jury instructed limiting use.	Court found no abuse of discretion: implicit finding notice was timely, statement admissible under 404(b) for intent, Rule 403 balance proper given limiting instruction.
Statutory target for Equal Protection challenge (concurrence): Did Rawlings attack the correct statute?	Rawlings targeted § 18‑1401 (burglary), arguing unequal felony punishment relative to misdemeanor shoplifting.	State/Concurrence: § 18‑1401 defines the offense but § 18‑1403 sets penalties; Rawlings attacked wrong provision regarding punishment.	Concurrence: even if merits lacking, appeal also fails because challenge targeted wrong statute governing penalties.

Key Cases Cited

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (statutory classification analysis for Equal Protection)
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (First Amendment does not bar evidentiary use of speech to show intent or motive)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (criminalizing acts with specific intent does not create impermissible thought crimes)
United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir.) (mens rea requirement and intent‑based offenses upheld)
State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339 (Idaho Ct. App.) (prior-shoplifting evidence admissible to show intent)
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111 (Idaho) (burglary complete upon entry with intent even if theft not completed)