State v. Ryan
261 P.3d 1189
Or.2011Background
- Oregon Supreme Court, en banc, addressed intersection of Article I, §8 free speech rights and ORS 163.750 stalking-protective-order violations.
- Defendant Ryan violated a stalking protective order by contacting the victim through a third party and was convicted on two counts; the Court of Appeals reversed.
- Victim was a Portland Tribune editor; after a 2005 event, defendant sent multiple letters and attempted contact, prompting a temporary order on March 14, 2007 prohibiting contact including via third parties.
- Defendant continued contacting through intermediaries and through the victim's father; letters in May 2007 and a May 14 package led to charges under ORS 163.750 (three counts); trial court denied acquittal and a jury convicted on two counts.
- The trial court and appellate history focused on whether ORS 163.750 could criminalize speech without violating free speech protections; the majority held the statute is not overbroad as applied because it targets only communications already prohibited by the stalking protective order.
- The court ultimately affirmed the convictions, rejecting the overbreadth challenge and concluding the defendant’s communications violated the order and were not protected speech.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 163.750 is overbroad under Article I, §8 as applied to communications prohibited by a stalking order. | State contends no overbreadth; order prohibits contact and ORS 163.750 bars prohibited communications; not an invalid speech restriction. | Ryan argues the statute sweeps in protected speech and must be narrowed like Rangel to an unequivocal threat. | Not overbroad as applied; permissible narrowing to prohibit only prohibited communications created under the order. |
| Whether ORS 163.750(1)(c) (speech-based element) survives Article I, §8 scrutiny given the order is speech-neutral overall. | Speech element appropriately tied to conduct that created reasonable apprehension, consistent with limiting punishment to prohibited communications. | Subsection(1)(c) requires a narrowing to avoid punishing protected speech. | Subsection(1)(c) is constitutionally permissible as a targeted limitation within a speech-related crime. |
| Whether defendant may challenge the underlying stalking order via collateral attack in a criminal conviction for violating ORS 163.750. | Mix v. Newland allows contempt for disobeying a valid order; invalid underlying order cannot be collaterally attacked in criminal proceeding. | Court should not permit collateral attack on the order through the ORS 163.750 conviction. | Defendant’s concession of the order’s validity forecloses collateral attack; ORS 163.750 not overbroad as applied. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Casey, 346 Or. 54, 203 P.3d 202 (2009) (underpins standard for evaluating challenged conviction in light of Rangel and overbreadth concerns)
- State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 977 P.2d 379 (1999) (held that stalking requires an unequivocal threat; narrowed statute to save from overbreadth)
- State ex rel. Mix v. Newland, 277 Or. 191, 560 P.2d 255 (1977) (collateral contempt principle—valid orders must be obeyed pending review)
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (neutral, content-based restrictions on expressive conduct)
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content-based limits on non-protected speech; general rule against viewpoint discrimination)
- Van Buskirk v. Ryan, 233 Or.App. 170, 225 P.3d 118 (2010) (Court of Appeals’ treatment of order validity and overbreadth context)