State v. Russell
2017 Ohio 2871
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Mark R. Russell was convicted by a jury of murder with a firearm specification (sentenced to 15 years-to-life plus 3 years) after a 2001 indictment for an August 2000 homicide.
- Russell pursued multiple direct appeals and collateral challenges over many years; this appeal concerns a 2016 delayed/successive petition for post-conviction relief that the trial court dismissed.
- His successive petition alleged prosecutorial misconduct in grand-jury testimony (misleading testimony about an alleged confession) and sought post-conviction discovery to support Brady and ineffective-assistance claims.
- The trial court dismissed the successive/untimely petition under res judicata and Ohio’s post-conviction timing/jurisdictional rules; Russell appealed.
- He relied on U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Martinez, Trevino, Montgomery) claiming they create retroactive rights permitting his untimely/successive challenge.
- The appellate court affirmed: Russell could have raised the issues earlier (res judicata), and the cited Supreme Court cases did not establish a new retroactive right that would permit his successive petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Russell's successive/delayed post-conviction petition | Russell argued dismissal violated his 6th and 14th Amendment rights because he was denied post-conviction procedures needed to litigate Brady and IAC claims | State argued petition was successive/untimely and barred by res judicata and R.C. 2953.23 jurisdictional limits | Court held no abuse: petition was barred by res judicata and statutory timing; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Martinez/Trevino create a new retroactive right permitting successive post-conviction relief in Ohio | Russell argued Martinez and Trevino announce a retroactive rule that overcomes procedural bars and requires post-conviction discovery/counsel access | State argued Ohio law differs from Martinez/Trevino factual predicates; those cases do not announce an applicable retroactive right to open successive collateral review in Ohio | Court held Martinez/Trevino do not create a retroactive substantive right here and do not mandate relief or counsel in Ohio post-conviction proceedings |
| Whether Montgomery requires retroactive application to Russell's claims | Russell relied on Montgomery’s rule on retroactivity of new substantive rules to support his successive petition | State argued Montgomery governs new substantive rules (e.g., juvenile LWOP) and does not apply to the procedural/equitable doctrines Russell cites | Court held Montgomery inapplicable because Russell did not identify a new substantive rule controlling his case |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (recognizes prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (creates an equitable rule for overcoming procedural default for IAC claims in limited circumstances)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (extends Martinez rationale in certain Texas cases where direct review is not a meaningful opportunity)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (holds that new substantive constitutional rules must be given retroactive effect on collateral review)