State v. Russell
291 Neb. 33
| Neb. | 2015Background
- Defendant Cory L. Russell pleaded no contest to one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child (State dismissed 26 of 27 counts under a plea agreement).
- Statute for the specific offense (§ 28-319.01(2)) states it is a Class IB felony with a mandatory minimum of 15 years.
- General sentencing statute for Class IB felonies (§ 28-105) sets a minimum of 20 years and maximum of life.
- Before accepting the plea the district court advised Russell the range was 20 years to life (not 15 to life); at sentencing the court said a "mandatory minimum of at least 20 years" and imposed 40–50 years.
- Russell appealed, arguing his plea was not knowing because he was misadvised about the statutory mandatory minimum and how good-time accrual/parole eligibility would be calculated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Russell) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "mandatory minimum" in § 28-319.01(2) | The term imposes special good-time/parole consequences distinct from the statutory Class IB minimum | The phrase denotes the low end of the sentence range (i.e., the statutory minimum) | "Mandatory minimum" equals the statute's specific low-end term but differs from a general minimum only by denying probation and precluding good-time accrual until it is served |
| Correct statutory sentencing range for first-offense first-degree child sexual assault | Range is 20 years to life; first 15 of that 20 are "mandatory" | Range is 15 years to life—the 15-year mandatory minimum is the floor | Range is 15 years to life; the specific 15-year minimum in § 28-319.01(2) controls over the general 20-year minimum in § 28-105 |
| Whether erroneous advisement of 20-year minimum invalidates plea | Plea was not knowing because court misadvised the mandatory minimum (impacting good time/parole) | Any advisement error was not prejudicial; plea was knowing and voluntary | Misadvisement of the minimum was erroneous but not prejudicial; plea stands because sentence imposed was within both the true statutory range and the range the court stated to defendant |
| Effect of incorrect truth-in-sentencing/parole advisements | Incorrect good-time/parole math prejudiced defendant’s understanding of actual time to be served | Truth-in-sentencing advisements are not part of the sentence; statutory sentencing terms control calculation | Trial judge’s statements on parole eligibility are not part of the sentence; the pronounced statutory terms control under § 29-2204, so incorrect parole/good-time statements do not invalidate the plea |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Covey, 290 Neb. 257, 859 N.W.2d 558 (Neb. 2015) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)
- State v. Lantz, 290 Neb. 757, 861 N.W.2d 728 (Neb. 2015) (discussed mandatory-minimum sentence consequences)
- State v. Rouse, 206 Neb. 371, 293 N.W.2d 83 (Neb. 1980) (failure to advise statutory penalties does not automatically require reversal; prejudice inquiry)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (federal rule and advisory committee notes do not require advising about parole eligibility before plea)