State v. Rushton
395 P.3d 92
Utah2017Background
- David Rushton, owner of Fooptube LLC, was prosecuted and convicted (2009–2010) for multiple tax-related offenses; he later faced a separate prosecution (2011–2012) for wage- and benefit-related offenses affecting dozens of former employees.
- Rushton moved to dismiss the wage prosecution under Utah's mandatory-joinder statute (Utah Code § 76-1-401 / § 76-1-402), arguing the tax and wage offenses were part of a single criminal episode sharing a single criminal objective (misappropriation of Fooptube funds).
- The district court denied the motion to dismiss; Rushton entered a conditional plea and appealed; the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed; the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the statutory interpretation.
- The statutory definition at issue: a “single criminal episode” is “all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.” The court considered the permissive-joinder statute (Utah Code § 77-8a-1) in interpreting that phrase.
- The Court rejected Rushton’s broad view (that any misappropriation at Fooptube is a single objective) because that reading would nullify the permissive-joinder statute; it adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach instead and found the tax and wage offenses did not share a single criminal objective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rushton) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether tax and wage offenses constituted a “single criminal episode” under Utah’s mandatory-joinder statute | The conduct shared one broad criminal objective (misappropriation of Fooptube money), so separate prosecutions are barred | The definition must be narrower to preserve the permissive-joinder statute; offenses here are distinct and may be separately prosecuted | Held: Not a single criminal episode; joinder not required; dismissal denied |
| Proper interpretation of “single criminal objective” | Broad meaning: any unified purpose (e.g., misappropriation) suffices | Must read in harmony with permissive-joinder statute; cannot collapse distinct statutory tests | Held: Rejected Rushton’s broad reading; adopt a context-sensitive test to avoid rendering permissive-joinder inoperative |
| Appropriate analytical framework for “single criminal objective” | Multi-factor analysis unnecessary if objective identified broadly | Totality-of-the-circumstances factors should guide whether conduct aims at one objective | Held: Adopted totality-of-the-circumstances approach (location, nature, victims, opportunity to deliberate) |
| Whether concurrence’s narrower “incident to an attempt/accomplishment of a single offense” test should control | (N/A to Rushton) | Concurrence: interpret “objective” as a specific offense and require direct, immediate relationship; more predictable | Held: Court rejected giving exclusive effect to concurrence’s narrower test, although it recognizes elements of that reasoning; majority prefers multi-factor test to harmonize statutes |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1995) (multi-factor test—location, nature, victims, and opportunity to deliberate—used to determine distinct criminal episodes)
- State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977) (separate crimes in different counties and with distinct objectives are not a single criminal episode)
- State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993) (finding a single criminal objective where offenses shared same victim and design)
- State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) (separate, independent offenses with different proof requirements are not a single criminal episode)
- State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. 2011) (objective of obtaining as much money as possible is too broad to constitute a single criminal goal)