State v. Rue, 2019 Ohio 1720

Defendant Lamont Maurice Rue was sentenced June 5, 2012 to five years of community control (term due to end June 5, 2017).
Alleged violations arose: first warrant issued March 9, 2017; court held a violation hearing April 20, 2017 and continued community control with added restitution conditions.
Parties disputed tolling from the first violation: Rue contended tolling ran from March 9–April 20, 2017 (42 days); the State asserted tolling began November 3, 2016 and lasted 168 days.
A second warrant was issued December 18, 2017 for failure to report (June 20, 2017–July 17, 2018); Rue was brought before the court August 23, 2018 and the trial court revoked community control and imposed a two-year prison term.
Rue appealed, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction because no revocation proceedings were instituted before his original community-control term expired; the appellate court reversed and vacated the prison sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to revoke Rue's community control and impose prison after the stated term expired?	Community control was tolled by Rue's failure to report/absconding, so the term had not expired and the court retained jurisdiction.	No tolling (or tolling was insufficient); no revocation proceedings were initiated during the original term, so the court lost jurisdiction.	Court held it lacked jurisdiction and reversed/vacated the sentence because revocation proceedings were not instituted during the original term.
Can issuance of an arrest warrant or docket notation alone suffice to initiate revocation proceedings and preserve jurisdiction?	State implied the warrant/docket entries were sufficient to initiate proceedings and toll community control.	Rue argued those were insufficient to preserve jurisdiction absent initiation of revocation proceedings before expiration.	Court declined to decide the precise standards for adequate notice/initiation but assumed best case for State and still found jurisdiction lacking on the facts.

State v. Yates, 58 Ohio St.3d 78 (1991) (trial court loses jurisdiction to impose sentence for probation violation if revocation proceedings are not instituted during original probation period)
State v. Simpson, 2 Ohio App.3d 40 (1st Dist. 1981) (court cannot sua sponte extend probation after expiration absent notice/assent; revocation must be initiated during original period)
State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307 (2011) (discusses that revocation proceedings must be commenced before expiration for court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate tolling issues)
Meyer v. State, 18 N.E.3d 805 (Ohio App. 2014) (contrasting view that court may determine whether tolling occurred even if proceedings not instituted within term)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (due process protections in revocation proceedings)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process requirements for parole revocation)
Davis v. Wolfe, 92 Ohio St.3d 549 (2001) (trial court generally lacks jurisdiction to revoke community control after term expiration)