State v. Rossiter, 453 P.3d 562

Background

A 12-year-old girl (S) died of untreated diabetic ketoacidosis after more than a month of illness; parents (defendant Rossiter and her husband) did not seek medical care despite severe, escalating symptoms shortly before death.
Autopsy and medical testimony established that timely treatment would likely have prevented death.
Parents are members of the General Assembly and Church of the First Born and practice avoiding conventional medicine, relying on God to heal; defendant testified she would not take a child to a doctor unless the child asked.
State charged both parents with first-degree manslaughter (ORS 163.118(1)(c)) and second-degree manslaughter; jury convicted defendant of first-degree manslaughter (verdicts merged).
At trial the court admitted (a) three medical experts’ testimony that failing to seek care deviated (negligent/gross deviation) from the standard of care and (b) evidence of defendant’s religious beliefs over defense OEC 403 objections; court imposed the mandatory 120-month Measure 11 sentence.
On appeal the court affirmed: defendant’s evidentiary challenge to expert testimony was not preserved and not plainly erroneous; admission of religious-belief evidence was within OEC 403 discretion; the as-applied proportionality challenge to the mandatory 120‑month sentence failed.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Rossiter's Argument	Held
Admission of experts’ testimony that failure to seek care deviated from the standard of care (OEC 702/703/403)	Experts’ opinions were relevant and helpful to explain DKA symptoms, risk, and customary caregiver response; OEC 704 allows ultimate-issue opinions.	Testimony improperly gave legal conclusions (negligence/gross deviation) and usurped the jury’s role; some objections were made but not on the specific rules asserted on appeal.	Not preserved for review as argued; any error was not plain under Ailes; admission affirmed.
Admission of evidence of defendant’s religious beliefs (OEC 401/403)	Highly probative of motive to not seek medical care (undermines defense that she thought it was only the flu); probative value outweighed risk of unfair prejudice.	Evidence was irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded under OEC 403.	Trial court did not abuse its discretion; evidence admissible to prove motive and probative value did not substantially outweigh prejudice.
As‑applied proportionality of mandatory 120‑month Measure 11 sentence (Article I, §16)	Mandatory sentence is within legislative policy and not disproportionate given the gravity of causing a child’s death by conscious disregard or gross deviation.	120 months is unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied given defendant’s lack of criminal history and mitigating circumstances (religious motive, belief she thought it was flu).	Court correctly rejected as-applied challenge: sentence does not "shock the moral sense"; comparisons to other homicide penalties and defendant’s conduct support proportionality.

Key Cases Cited

Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or. 376 (1991) (plain-error standard for unpreserved legal errors)
Madrid v. Robinson, 324 Or. 561 (1997) (trial court’s discretion to admit expert opinion that may assist jury on contested factual issues)
State v. Southard, 347 Or. 127 (2009) (OEC 403 exclusion where expert "diagnosis" adds little beyond jury’s capability and risks undue deference)
State v. Brumwell, 350 Or. 93 (2011) (evidence of religious beliefs admissible to prove motive when reasonably inferable)
State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or. 46 (2009) (Measure 11 limits on trial court sentencing discretion; proportionality framework)
State v. Nistler, 268 Or. App. 470 (2015) (expert testimony appropriate where subject matter is beyond lay understanding)
Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or. 247 (1970) (trial judge’s latitude in admitting expert testimony that may assist the jury)