State v. Roland Dow, 131 A.3d 389

Background

In Sept. 2012, defendant Roland Dow lived with girlfriend Jessica Linscott and her 3-year-old son J.N.; defendant disciplined both Linscott and J.N. and repeatedly physically abused Linscott.
J.N. began having seizure-like episodes in Nov. 2012; hospital exams revealed fluid around his brain and raised abuse concerns.
Linscott initially denied abuse to hospital staff and police but later, after arrest, described physical abuse by the defendant and bore visible injury.
Defendant was charged with multiple counts related to assaulting J.N., endangering a child, witness tampering, and unlawful interception; tried by jury and convicted on most counts.
Pretrial, defendant moved to exclude evidence of uncharged abuse of Linscott under NH R. Ev. 404(b); trial court admitted her testimony about the defendant’s abuse to explain her delayed reporting and false statements.
The State also called an expert on domestic violence (Dr. Scott Hampton) to describe typical dynamics and explain victim behavior; court allowed general, non-case-specific testimony.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility under NH R. Ev. 404(b) of evidence that defendant abused Linscott	Evidence is relevant for non-propensity purpose — explains Linscott’s fear, delayed reporting, and false statements; clear proof of acts exists; probative value outweighs prejudice	Evidence is impermissible prior-bad-act evidence used to show propensity; prejudicial because similar to charged acts	Affirmed — admitted under 404(b): relevant to explain victim/witness behavior; clear proof of acts; prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value
Whether State met first prong of 404(b) (relevance/chain of reasoning)	Prior abuse bears a significant logical connection to material events (delay/lying), satisfying the test	No direct proof that Linscott acted out of fear; proffer insufficient	Affirmed — trial court did not unsustainably exercise discretion; record (offers/proffers) supported relevance
Whether trial court properly weighed unfair prejudice under 404(b)	Though emotionally prejudicial, evidence was no more inflammatory than charged conduct and was critical to contextualize Linscott’s credibility	Prior acts were similar to charged conduct; highly prejudicial and likely to inflame jury	Affirmed — trial court’s balancing was reasonable; probative value upheld given centrality of Linscott’s testimony
Admissibility of general expert testimony on domestic violence under NH R. Ev. 702	Expert testimony helps jury understand counterintuitive victim behavior (delay, lying, failure to protect); admissible in general terms and not case-specific	Expert testimony improper absent recantation/minimization and risked transforming Linscott into an uncharged victim, prejudicing defendant	Affirmed — expert testimony describing dynamics was permissible, non-case-specific, and court’s limiting instructions mitigated prejudice

Key Cases Cited

State v. Beltran, 153 N.H. 643 (N.H. 2006) (articulates three-part test for admitting other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b))
State v. Russell, 159 N.H. 475 (N.H. 2010) (discusses relevance and balancing under Rule 404(b))
State v. Smalley, 151 N.H. 193 (N.H. 2004) (addresses emotional impact factor in 404(b) balancing)
State v. Costello, 159 N.H. 113 (N.H. 2009) (probative-value analysis for contested evidence)
State v. Searles, 141 N.H. 224 (N.H. 1996) (permits expert testimony on domestic violence syndrome to explain victim behavior to jury)
State v. Tabaldi, 165 N.H. 306 (N.H. 2013) (recognizes trial court latitude in admitting prejudicial evidence)
State v. Howe, 159 N.H. 366 (N.H. 2009) (other-acts evidence not necessarily more inflammatory than charged acts)
Commonwealth v. Morris, 974 N.E.2d 1152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (expert domestic-violence testimony admissible to help jurors assess counterintuitive victim behavior)