State v. Rohwedder, 436 P.3d 324

In December 2011 police saw Rohwedder driving a reported stolen vehicle; he fled, abandoned the car, and was arrested nearby; charged with theft by receiving stolen property, failure to stop, and failure to signal.
Rohwedder was convicted at jury trial in January 2014; this court reversed because the trial court failed to address his repeated requests to represent himself; case remanded.
On remand Rohwedder insisted on self-representation but demanded either a law library or standby counsel; the court allowed self-representation and appointed standby counsel with limited duties (assist with legal materials and subpoenas).
Pretrial Rohwedder objected to wearing leg restraints in front of the jury and proposed alternatives; the court required leg restraints and offered measures to conceal them, which Rohwedder declined because he wanted to move in court.
After a continuance at Rohwedder’s request to find witnesses/evidence, a two-day retrial in April 2015 resulted in convictions on all counts; Rohwedder appealed raising speedy-trial, visible restraints, and claims about self-representation/standby counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Speedy trial	State: retrial timing measured from appellate mandate; delay not presumptively prejudicial	Rohwedder: >3 years from charge to retrial violated Sixth Amendment	Court: use time from appellate mandate to retrial (146 days); no presumptive prejudice; no violation
Visible restraints	State: restraints permissible for security; alternatives offered	Rohwedder: shackles visible to jury were inherently prejudicial; court could have minimized prejudice	Court: trial court offered concealment; Rohwedder rejected it to preserve movement; any prejudice was self-created; no error
Right to self-representation	State: court ensured waiver was knowing; standby counsel’s role limited	Rohwedder: standby counsel failed to provide legal materials and subpoena witnesses, undermining self-representation	Court: waiver was knowing; standby counsel was only a resource; record silent on counsel’s failures so assume duties performed; no violation
Ineffective assistance via standby counsel	State: standby counsel has limited role; no guaranteed Sixth Amendment baseline; due process requires fairness	Rohwedder: standby counsel’s alleged omissions deprived him of effective assistance and fair trial	Court: standby counsel must discharge limited duties, but record lacks proof of failure or prejudice; claim fails

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (right to speedy trial balancing test)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (right to self-representation and waiver standards)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (limits on standby counsel and pro se status)
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (retrial after reversal does not automatically violate speedy-trial right)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (delays approaching one year presumptively prejudicial guidance)
United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198 (one-year guideline for presumptive prejudice in speedy-trial analysis)
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987) (colloquy and assurances required for knowing waiver of counsel)
State v. Madsen, 57 P.3d 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (prejudice from visible shackling can undermine fairness)
State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000) (ambiguities in record are construed to support finding effective performance)