State v. Rogers, 457 P.3d 363

Defendant (Safeway employee) posted violent statements on a Facebook post visible only to her Facebook "friends," including: “That box cutter I’m gonna put to good use tomorrow!!! Watch out [K]!” and comments like “I will cut your throat!!” and “I’m gonna kill you!!”.
The post named K (defendant’s supervisor) once by first name; K did not have a Facebook account and never saw the post on Facebook itself.
Numerous third parties sent K screenshots of the Facebook post via text; K reported the matter to police the same night.
A police chief who was Facebook friends with defendant viewed the post directly, contacted defendant at work, and defendant admitted authorship but said she wouldn’t actually kill K.
Defendant was tried (bench trial), convicted under ORS 166.065(1)(c) (harassment by conveying an electronic threat to commit a felony involving the person), moved for judgment of acquittal, and appealed the denial of that motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the state failed to present legally sufficient evidence that defendant intentionally intended to convey the threat to K.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether “convey” under ORS 166.065(1)(c) includes indirect communications via intermediaries	"Convey" includes indirect electronic communication (plain meaning).	"Convey" should be read narrowly to require direct communication to the victim.	Not decided on the merits—court resolved appeal on insufficiency of intent evidence.
Whether evidence was sufficient to prove defendant intentionally conveyed the threat to K	Post content, comments, screenshots forwarded to K, and officer seeing post suffice to infer intent that K be informed and alarmed.	No evidence defendant believed K used Facebook or that she intended intermediaries to inform K; inference of intent is speculative.	Reversed: evidence insufficient to show defendant had conscious objective that K perceive the threat.
Whether circumstantial evidence here could support inference of intent (stacking inferences)	Circumstantial inferences from acts and post content are permissible to prove intent.	Required inferences (mutual acquaintances, defendant’s awareness, desire to inform K) are too speculative.	Held that required inference stacking was too great; circumstantial evidence insufficient in this record.

State v. Reed, 339 Or 239 (establishes standard for review of sufficiency of evidence on acquittal motion)
State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691 (describes elements of harassment statute)
State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460 (explains limits on inferential stacking from circumstantial evidence)
State v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or 724 (discusses reasonable-inference standard versus speculation)
State v. Macnab, 222 Or App 332 (notes difficulty of drawing bright line between reasonable inference and speculation)
State v. Hendricks, 273 Or App 1 (insufficient evidence of specific intent where expressive acts lacking)
State v. Nelson, 267 Or App 621 (insufficiency where speaker lacked evidence that statements would move beyond conversation)
State v. Hennagir, 246 Or App 456 (jurors typically infer intent from defendant’s acts)