312 P.3d 555
Or. Ct. App.2013Background
- Defendant was charged with two counts of strangulation for allegedly choking his ex‑girlfriend and their four‑year‑old son; jury convicted on one count relating to the ex‑girlfriend.
- The state sought to introduce testimony and a 2004 fourth‑degree assault conviction of AM (a prior girlfriend) describing choking and threats, to prove defendant’s intent/knowledge.
- The trial court admitted AM’s testimony and the conviction for the limited purpose of intent/knowledge and gave a limiting instruction, but did not condition consideration of the prior act on a prior finding that the charged acts occurred.
- Defendant’s trial theory was that the charged incidents never occurred; defense witnesses disputed the complainant’s account and noted no visible injuries.
- On appeal, the court considered whether admission of prior bad‑acts evidence under OEC 404(3) was plain error in light of recent Supreme Court decisions (Leistiko, Pitt) requiring that such evidence be considered for intent only after a jury first finds the charged act occurred.
- The Court of Appeals concluded the admission without the required conditional limiting instruction was plain error, likely affected the verdict given lack of physical evidence and inflammatory nature of prior acts, and reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court properly admitted prior‑bad‑acts evidence to prove intent under OEC 404(3) | Prior assault conviction and AM’s testimony show intent/knowledge and satisfy Johns factors | Evidence inadmissible because defendant disputed commission of charged acts and jury was not instructed to consider prior acts only after finding charged acts occurred | Admission was plain error because the limiting instruction failed to require a prior finding that the charged acts occurred; reversal and remand ordered |
| Whether limiting instruction cured risk of propensity reasoning | Limiting instruction limited use to intent/knowledge | Instruction insufficient because it did not condition consideration on a prior finding that the charged acts occurred | Instruction inadequate; error not harmless given circumstances |
| Whether error is plain and warrants discretionary correction on appeal | State did not address plain‑error standard favorably | Error meets plain‑error criteria under post‑Leistiko law; affects jury verdict | Court exercised discretion to correct error and reversed conviction |
| Whether error was harmless | State implied harmlessness because conviction supported by testimony | Defendant argued error likely affected verdict given lack of physical evidence | Error was not harmless; inflammatory prior evidence likely affected verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 725 P.2d 312 (Or. 1986) (framework for admitting prior bad acts to prove intent)
- State v. Leistiko, 352 Or. 172, 282 P.3d 857 (Or. 2012) (prior‑acts evidence relevant to intent must be conditioned on a finding that the charged act occurred)
- State v. Pitt, 352 Or. 566, 293 P.3d 1002 (Or. 2012) (uncharged misconduct is only conditionally relevant absent defendant’s stipulation; jury must first find charged act occurred)
- State v. Jones, 258 Or. App. 1, 308 P.3d 347 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (applying Leistiko; admission without proper conditioning is plain error)
- State v. Hutton, 258 Or. App. 806, 311 P.3d 909 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (error to admit prior bad acts without proper jury conditioning)
- State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19, 77 P.3d 1111 (Or. 2003) (harmless‑error analysis for constitutional and nonconstitutional errors)
