State v. Rodriguez, 185 A.3d 221

Five defendants pleaded guilty to fourth-degree operating with a suspended license under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26; trial court sentenced each to serve a 180-day, parole-ineligible custodial minimum intermittently (nights/weekends).
The State appealed, arguing the statute’s 180-day parole-ineligibility requirement implicitly mandates continuous service and therefore precludes intermittent sentencing under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7).
Several defendants reserved the right to withdraw pleas if intermittent sentences were invalidated; some prior appellate decisions (French, Harris) had already constrained non-custodial alternatives under this statute.
The Appellate Division analyzed statutory text, legislative history, and prior decisions to determine whether intermittent service is compatible with the fixed 180-day parole-ineligible minimum.
The court held intermittent sentences are permitted, but a statutory "day" means a continuous 24-hour period for counting toward the 180-day minimum; partial days (e.g., nights-only reporting) cannot be aggregated to count as full statutory days absent express authority.
Remedy: reversed and remanded for two defendants sentenced to nights-only (Rodriguez, Colon); modified two weekend sentences (Lowers, Nolan) to ensure each weekend yields full-day credit; remanded Swiderski’s sentence for reconsideration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c)’s 180‑day fixed minimum parole-ineligible term precludes intermittent sentences under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7)	"Term" and parole-ineligibility imply uninterrupted continuous custody; intermittent release is functionally like parole and undermines punitive purpose	Intermittent service is distinct from parole, does not shorten total confinement, and is an authorized custodial form under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7)	Intermittent sentences are permissible; periodic release is not parole and does not reduce the fixed minimum term
Whether partial-day/night or weekend stints may be aggregated (or counted as full days) to satisfy the 180 statutory "days"	Partial-day credits or counting methods (analogous to jail credit rules) could permit aggregation, making intermittent service effectively shorter	A statutory "day" is a 24‑hour period; partial days should be credited only for time actually served and cannot be aggregated into full statutory days absent express statutory authority	A "day" requires a continuous 24‑hour custody period to count as one of the 180 days; nights-only or partial-day sentences that do not include continuous 24‑hour periods are insufficient and require resentencing or modification

State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998) (definition and purpose of parole)
State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456 (2003) (consequences of parole revocation and supervised-release nature of parole)
State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228 (2017) (statutory interpretation principles: plain meaning controls)
State v. Silva, 236 N.J. Super. 90 (Law Div. 1989) (intermittent custody does not change duration of confinement)
State v. French, 437 N.J. Super. 333 (App. Div. 2014) (limitations on non-custodial alternatives under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26)
State v. Harris, 439 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 2015) (same; constrained treatment/home-detention alternatives)
State v. Denelsbeck, 225 N.J. 103 (2016) (context on Legislature’s emphasis against impaired driving recidivism)
State v. Rosado, 131 N.J. 423 (1993) (jail credit principles and limits on modifying mandatory minimums)