State v. Rodriguez, 2013 WL 6246792

On April 28, 2012, a 911 caller reported being pushed out of a moving dark GMC Envoy near a rental car business; dispatch said the vehicle left westbound on Highway 26.
Officer Kleensang, near the area, observed a vehicle matching the description heading west, followed it, and activated emergency lights after the vehicle stopped; he then questioned and detained driver Lucio A. Rodriguez III.
Kleensang detected strong alcohol odor, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and administered field sobriety tests; Rodriguez’s breath test measured .226 g/210L and he was charged with DUI (>.15, third offense), possession of cocaine, and possession of methamphetamine.
During booking the officer inventoried Rodriguez’s wallet and found two baggies; lab testing later identified one as cocaine and the other as not a controlled substance; methamphetamine tests excluded the drug before trial.
Rodriguez moved to suppress the stop; the district court denied suppression (analyzing both tier‑one and tier‑two contacts) and later denied a mistrial after the prosecutor conceded he could not prove the methamphetamine charge; the jury convicted Rodriguez of DUI and acquitted him of cocaine possession; the court directed a verdict on the methamphetamine count.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the stop was a tier‑one (no seizure) contact	Rodriguez: activation of patrol lights made the stop a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion	State: conceded it was a tier‑two seizure and argued reasonable suspicion existed; alternatively, vehicle stopped voluntarily	Court declined to decide tier‑one issue as unnecessary; treated as tier‑two and addressed reasonable suspicion — stop upheld
Whether the 911 informant provided sufficient corroboration for reasonable suspicion	Rodriguez: anonymous caller reliability was not established, so stop lacked reasonable suspicion	State: dispatcher report + matching vehicle description, location, and direction corroborated the tip	Totality of circumstances (dispatcher report, timely corroboration by officer) provided reasonable suspicion; suppression denied
Whether a mistrial was required after prosecutor admitted he could not prove methamphetamine charge	Rodriguez: prosecutor’s failure to dismiss known‑unprovable charge was prejudicial (juror excused over methamphetamine) and warranted mistrial	State: error was an oversight; court could remedy through directed verdict and instructions; no unfair prejudice to DUI/trial outcome	Court found prosecutor’s conduct improper but not so prejudicial as to require mistrial; directed verdict on methamphetamine; conviction for DUI affirmed

State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193, 835 N.W.2d 698 (standard of review for suppression rulings)
State v. Watson, 285 Neb. 497, 827 N.W.2d 507 (standard of review for mistrial decisions)
State v. Burdette, 259 Neb. 679, 611 N.W.2d 615 (tiers of police‑citizen encounters)
State v. Pangborn, 286 Neb. 363, 836 N.W.2d 790 (avoidance of unnecessary appellate analysis)
State v. Lamb, 280 Neb. 738, 789 N.W.2d 918 (reasonable suspicion for investigative stops)
State v. Bowers, 250 Neb. 151, 548 N.W.2d 725 (justification for investigatory stops)
State v. Morrissey, 19 Neb. App. 590, 810 N.W.2d 195 (purpose and scope of investigative stops)
State v. Wollam, 280 Neb. 43, 783 N.W.2d 612 (totality of circumstances and informant reliability)
State v. Bowley, 232 Neb. 771, 442 N.W.2d 215 (presumptive reliability of citizen informant and corroboration factors)
State v. Ege, 227 Neb. 824, 420 N.W.2d 305 (factors bearing on informant reliability and stops)
State v. Dixon, 282 Neb. 274, 802 N.W.2d 866 (mistrial standard: prejudicial events requiring mistrial)
State v. Barfield, 272 Neb. 502, 723 N.W.2d 303 (improper prosecutorial conduct and prejudice)
State v. McCulloch, 274 Neb. 636, 742 N.W.2d 727 (related prosecutorial‑conduct precedent)