State v. Roden
179 Wash. 2d 893
Wash.2014Background
- Longview police arrested Daniel Lee for heroin possession and seized his iPhone, which continued to receive calls/texts at the station.
- Detective Kevin Sawyer took custody of the phone, browsed it for ~5–10 minutes, found texts from Jonathan Roden, and—posing as Lee—replied to arrange a drug transaction.
- Roden arrived at the arranged meeting and was arrested and charged with attempted possession of heroin; Roden moved to suppress evidence arguing violations of Washington’s Privacy Act (ch. 9.73 RCW) and the state and federal constitutions.
- The trial court denied suppression; Roden was convicted on stipulated facts; the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court majority held the Privacy Act was violated because Sawyer intercepted private text messages without consent or a warrant and reversed Roden’s conviction without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were Roden’s text messages “private communications” under RCW 9.73.030? | Roden: texts were intended only for Lee, discussing illicit conduct, so protected. | State: sender’s privacy expectation is unreasonable given risk someone possessing recipient’s phone could read messages. | Held: Yes — texts are private; subjective expectation of privacy was reasonable. |
| Did Detective Sawyer “intercept” the text messages within the meaning of the Privacy Act? | Roden: Sawyer read and replied to messages before Lee received them — that is an interception without consent or warrant. | State/WAPA: once messages reached the phone (electronic storage) they were not intercepted; alternatively, Sawyer was effectively a party, so no interception. | Held: Yes — manipulating, reading, and responding to texts before recipient’s access constituted an interception under the statute. |
| Does the stored/electronic nature of texts place them outside the Act’s scope? | Roden: WA statute should be interpreted broadly; technical storage distinctions irrelevant. | State/WAPA: federal precedents treat stored electronic communications differently; WA statute lacks those technical distinctions. | Held: WA law is broader; stored-status technicalities do not avoid interception liability here. |
| Was suppression barred because of exigent circumstances or consent? | Roden: no consent from Lee or Roden; no exigency; warrant could have been sought. | State: implied consent argument (Townsend) and operational reasons for accessing the phone. | Held: No consent or exigency; Townsend distinguishable; suppression warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666 (Wash. 2002) (adopted dictionary-based test for “private” and analyzed implied consent for recorded electronic communications)
- State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476 (Wash. 1996) (declined narrow definitions for ‘‘transmit’’; protected cordless telephone conversations)
- State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186 (Wash. 2004) (articulated four-prong Privacy Act analysis and rejected requirement that interception use a separate device)
- State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211 (Wash. 1996) (considered presence of third parties and voluntariness when determining privacy)
- State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862 (Wash. 2014) (related case addressing Fourth Amendment/privacy questions for text messages)
- United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussed risk that possession of a pager permits message reception; relied on by Court of Appeals but distinguished by the Supreme Court majority)