State v. Rochester, 1810008309

Background

On Oct. 15, 2018 police observed James Rochester driving a silver Impala; officers saw him "rack" the slide of a handgun, conceal it in his waistband, and commit two stop‑sign traffic violations in a high‑crime area; the vehicle was later searched and a .45 handgun and cash were recovered.
Rochester was charged with multiple weapons and drug counts; he filed a suppression motion (arguing illegal stop/search), which the Superior Court denied after a hearing.
On the morning trial was to begin (June 17, 2019) Rochester pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement recommending a combined eight‑year sentence (five years mandatory); remaining charges were nolle prossed.
Rochester appealed pro se to the Delaware Supreme Court (arguing lack of probable cause); the Supreme Court affirmed, noting guilty pleas generally waive pre‑plea errors.
Rochester then filed a timely Rule 61 postconviction motion alleging multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel (principally concerning suppression litigation, advice about appeals, and plea advice); a Superior Court Commissioner recommended denial, and the Superior Court adopted that recommendation and denied relief.

Issues

Issue	Rochester's Argument	State / Counsel's Argument	Held
1. Was counsel ineffective for failing to properly litigate the suppression (illegal stop/search)?	Counsel failed to present controlling case law and fully litigate reasonable‑suspicion/probable‑cause issues.	Counsel filed and argued a suppression motion; the observed conduct (racking slide, concealing weapon, slow rolling, traffic violations) gave reasonable suspicion/probable cause; additional cases cited by Rochester were inapposite.	Denied — counsel's performance was reasonable; suppression relief was unlikely; no Strickland prejudice shown.
2. Was counsel ineffective for failing to advise about interlocutory appeal or failing to explain appeal rights waived by the plea?	Counsel did not advise Rochester of right to interlocutory appeal or adequately explain appeal waiver at plea.	Delaware has no interlocutory criminal appeal; plea forms and colloquy show Rochester was informed and knowingly waived appeal rights.	Denied — no interlocutory appeal right; plea colloquy and forms establish knowing, voluntary waiver.
3. Was counsel ineffective for inducing the guilty plea or misadvising about the sentence Rochester would serve?	Counsel induced plea via faulty legal advice and misadvised Rochester he would only serve six years of an eight‑year sentence.	Counsel denies misadvice; plea paperwork, colloquy, and counsel affidavit show Rochester understood consequences; plea was advantageous given exposure.	Denied — Rochester bound by plea statements; no credible evidence of misadvice or prejudice.
4. Was counsel ineffective for failing to reargue/supplement suppression ruling, file an interlocutory appeal, or object to alleged inconsistencies at the suppression hearing?	Counsel failed to file reconsideration/interlocutory appeal and failed to object to testimonial inconsistencies.	Filing frivolous motions or meritless appeals would be improper; objections are strategic and inconsistencies go to impeachment, not necessarily to immediate exclusion; no reasonable probability the result would differ.	Denied — counsel's choices were reasonable strategic decisions; no prejudice established.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988) (Delaware adoption of Strickland standard).
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (ineffective assistance can establish cause for procedural default).
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (Del. 1997) (requirements for prejudice in guilty‑plea ineffective‑assistance claims).
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (standards for determining guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary).
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (heightened scrutiny for counsel performance in Fourth Amendment contexts).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990) (discussing demanding standard for evaluating counsel's performance).