State v. Robinson
209 A.3d 25
Del.2019Background
- Robinson was indicted for separate shootings (Nov. 2014); his counsel Natalie Woloshin represented him in those matters and a related TMG case subject to a protective order limiting distribution of witness-identifying materials but allowing discussion of content.
- DOJ prosecutors, without a warrant or notice to defense counsel, directed DOC to search Robinson’s cell on June 30, 2017 and seized his legal paperwork, including letters from counsel and handwritten notes reflecting trial strategy; multiple DOJ personnel reviewed the materials (including a paralegal who was part of the prosecution team).
- Defense moved to dismiss on Sixth Amendment grounds; the Superior Court conducted hearings and an in camera review, found the State intentionally invaded the attorney-client privilege, found both presumed and actual prejudice, and dismissed the first-degree murder indictment with prejudice.
- The State appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that the State violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right and that Robinson suffered actual prejudice, but held that dismissal was not appropriately tailored to the injury given the record.
- The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s dismissal, remanded for further proceedings, and imposed sanctions short of dismissal: disqualification of specific prosecutors/investigators from the case and an order to destroy the State’s trial work product developed thus far.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State’s warrantless search/review of defendant’s cell documents violated the Sixth Amendment | Robinson: DOJ’s search and review of privileged attorney-client materials intentionally invaded right to counsel and disclosed trial strategy; prejudice is presumed or shown. | State: No Sixth Amendment violation because no demonstrable prejudice occurred; Fourth Amendment prison-cell rationale justified search; no need for dismissal. | Held: Violation established. The Court affirms that DOJ deliberately invaded privileged materials and that Robinson suffered actual prejudice. |
| Whether prejudice must be shown (or presumed) when the government obtains privileged defense strategy | Robinson: Prejudice may be presumed when prosecution intentionally obtains defense strategy. | State: Prejudice must be shown; dismissal improper absent demonstrable, irreparable prejudice. | Held: Court avoids settling the circuit split; because trial court found actual prejudice on the record, no need to adopt or reject a per se rule. |
| Whether dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate remedy | Robinson: Dismissal justified as necessary deterrent and because prejudice was irreparable. | State: Dismissal was extreme and unnecessary; lesser, tailored remedies available. | Held: Dismissal was not appropriately tailored under Morrison; reversed. Court orders narrower sanctions (disqualification of personnel, destruction of work product) and remands. |
| Whether the State’s investigatory safeguards (taint team, screening, discovery production) were adequate | Robinson: State failed to employ a taint team and failed to screen prosecution effectively, compounding prejudice. | State: Adopted ad hoc screening; no evidence privileged materials were used by trial prosecutors. | Held: State’s procedures were inadequate and contributed to the violation; Court condemns conduct and prescribes disqualification and destruction of work product as remedies. |
Key Cases Cited
- Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (Supreme Court test for Sixth Amendment intrusion requires communication of substance to prosecution or a realistic possibility of injury to defendant).
- United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) (deliberate intrusion into attorney-client relationship warrants remedies tailored to injury; dismissal is drastic and improper absent demonstrable or threatened prejudice).
- United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978) (Third Circuit held disclosure of defense strategy to prosecution can give rise to per se prejudice and severe remedies).
- United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1984) (applies Weatherford factors; distinguishes intentional intrusion, disclosure, and prejudice).
- Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (explains purpose and importance of attorney-client privilege to encourage full communications).