State v. Robins, 431 P.3d 260

Background

Anthony Robins was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting two first‑degree murders and an attempted first‑degree murder; he appealed.
While jailed pretrial, Robins prepared handwritten notes in anticipation of a meeting with counsel; deputies seized the notes during a cell search ordered after a prosecutor sought a letter purportedly from co‑defendant Douglas.
The seized notes were delivered to and retained by an Ada County deputy prosecutor (who scanned and emailed them to defense counsel) for several months before the district court ordered their return; the district court found the notes were privileged.
The district court ruled the notes were inadmissible and required Robins to object at trial if the State used material traceable to the notes; no such objection was made at trial.
A letter from Douglas (intercepted from an unaffiliated inmate) was admitted at trial against Robins under the statements‑against‑interest hearsay exception; Robins objected and also sought severance from Douglas’s trial.
On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the State can rebut a presumption of prejudice from its access to Robins’s privileged strategy notes; it also held the Douglas letter was overbroadly admitted.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Robins's Argument	Held
Whether district court’s remedy (requiring Robins to object at trial before burden shifts) was adequate after prosecutor accessed privileged notes	Robins failed to show actual prejudice; he should bear initial burden to identify prejudice at trial	The court should have shifted burden to State once a prima facie showing of prejudice existed because prosecutor accessed privileged defense strategy	The remedy was inadequate; Robins made a prima facie showing and the burden should have shifted to the State to prove no prejudice; conviction vacated and case remanded for evidentiary (Kastigar‑type) hearing
Standard and procedure for determining prejudice when prosecution obtains defense strategy	If the intrusion was not deliberate or prosecutors were insulated, defendant must show actual prejudice	Where prosecution had prolonged access to privileged strategy, a presumption of prejudice arises and is rebuttable only by State proving independent origin of evidence/strategy	Adopted a Danielson/Kastigar framework: defendant need only make prima facie showing that prosecution affirmatively obtained privileged strategy; then State must prove by preponderance that trial evidence/strategy had independent origin; if not, district court to assess prejudice and appropriate remedy
Admissibility of Douglas’s letter (hearsay/statements‑against‑interest) and severance motion	Letter admissible against Robins under I.R.E. 804(b)(3) as a self‑inculpatory narrative by Douglas; severance not required	Much of the letter is non‑self‑inculpatory and shifts blame to Robins; Williamson prohibits admission of a full narrative that contains parts that only inculpate the defendant	Court held the district court erred: only the explicit admission "I bodyed them 2 dudes" was genuinely self‑inculpatory for Douglas; the rest should not have been admitted under the statements‑against‑interest exception

Key Cases Cited

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932 (Idaho 1990) (remand for hearing where recordings may have revealed privileged attorney‑client communications)
State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 1982) (no substantial prejudice found where substance of recordings was not shown)
United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2003) (burden‑shifting/Kastigar framework when government affirmatively obtains defense strategy)
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (U.S. 1977) (passive government informant doctrine and limits on intrusion)
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (U.S. 1972) (government must show independent source to permit use of compelled testimony)
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (U.S. 1994) (statements‑against‑interest exception does not admit non‑self‑inculpatory parts of a broader narrative)
State v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019 (Wash. 1963) (case dismissal where prosecutor presumed to have had access to eavesdropped attorney‑client communications)
State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879 (Ct. App. 2006) (applying Williamson to third‑party statements‑against‑interest)
State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618 (Idaho 1984) (Idaho statutory attorney‑client privilege principles)
Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201 (Idaho 1996) (requirements for communications to qualify for attorney‑client privilege)